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Abstract. Quantum communication has been leading the way of many remarkable theoretical results and
experimental tests in physics. In this context, quantum communication complexity (QCC) has recently
drawn earnest research attention as a tool to optimize the amounts of transmitted qubits and energy that
are required to implement distributed computational tasks. On this matter, we introduce a novel multi-user
quantum fingerprinting protocol that is ready to be implemented with existing technology. Particularly,
we extend to the multi-user framework a well-known two-user coherent-state fingerprinting scheme. This
generalization is highly non-trivial for a twofold reason, as it requires not only to extend the set of protocol
rules but also to specify a procedure for designing the optical devices intended for the generalized protocol.
Much of the importance of our work arises from the fact that the obtained QCC figures of merit allow direct
comparison with the best-known classical multi-user fingerprinting protocol, of significance in the field of
computer technologies and networking. Furthermore, as one of the main contributions of the manuscript,
we deduce innovative analytical upper bounds on the amount of transmitted quantum information that are
even valid in the two-user protocol as a particular case. These original analytical bounds are of interest for
estimating the realistic protocol performance prior to experimental realizations. Ultimately, comparative
results are provided to contrast different protocol implementation strategies and, importantly, to show that,
under realistic circumstances, the multi-user protocol can achieve tasks that are impossible by using classical
communication alone. Our work provides relevant contributions towards understanding the nature and the
limitations of quantum fingerprinting and, on a broader scope, also the limitations and possibilities of
quantum-communication networks embracing a node that is accessed by multiple users at the same time.
1. Introduction
Quantum-communication networks [1–5] are widely regarded as prospective central platforms for
implementing next-generation distributed information-processing protocols. Such networks will play a crucial
role delivering to multiple users enhanced capabilities that are attainable by harnessing the quantum-
mechanical properties of light. Many of these quantum-improved capabilities are already well understood
nowadays, yet our present-day knowledge and experimental results are mostly limited to the context of
restricted frameworks, e.g. point-to-point communication schemes merely involving two distant users. Extant
application examples that exploit quantum enhancements include improved metrology systems [6], machine
learning with quantum neural networks [7, 8], and quantum cryptographic protocols that deliver a level of
security that is classically unattainable [9–11].
Quantum communication complexity (QCC) has emerged as a discipline to study the communication
cost of distributed quantum protocols. Namely, the minimum amount of information, measured in qubits,
that must be transmitted through a quantum network to solve distributed computational problems [12–17].
In this general context, the network users are assumed to have certain quantum resources at their direct
disposal, such as entangled-photon sources and quantum channels. Equivalently, in theoretical computer
science, (classical) communication complexity deals with bits of transmitted information when the parties are
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
00
70
8v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
1 J
un
 20
20
Multi-party quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 2
restrained to use classical resources alone [18,19]. Both the classical and the quantum cases have customarily
corresponded to a scenario in which just two parties, Alice and Bob, receive respective N -bit input sequences
x, y ∈ {0, 1}N . Subsequently, under this conventional scenario, the pair of distant users seek to cooperatively
compute the value of an arbitrary Boolean function f(x, y). They are subject to the important constraint
of keeping as low as possible the amount of transmitted information. Remarkably, quantum supremacy
was demonstrated in this context, viz. theoretical results [12, 13, 15] and experimental implementations
[16, 17, 20–23] have been published hitherto reporting distributed information-processing protocols that
implement computational tasks that are unfeasible by exclusively using classical communication.
The specific model of interest for communication complexity that we adhere to in this work is called
simultaneous message passing model and it was also subscribed in all the pertinent references above, both
classical and quantum. This model was first described in the classical context by Yao [18] and it features
two basic requirement assumptions suitably applicable in any real-world technological settings: (i) Alice and
Bob are not permitted to retrieve shared randomness; (ii) Alice and Bob each send messages to a third
party, the referee, whose ultimate role is to determine the value of the function f(x, y). Specifically, this
latter requirement means that Alice and Bob may not communicate to each other in a direct manner and,
additionally, for computational purposes, the communication path to the referee node must be one-way only.
Amidst all the QCC protocols, the class of quantum fingerprinting (QF) protocols is undoubtedly the
most actively investigated in recent years [12, 15–17, 21–25]. QF was first introduced by Buhrman et al
in [12] as a prominent theoretical problem whose classical fingerprinting counterpart had been previously
well-established [18,19,26–29]. The seminal inception of the fingerprinting concept naturally appears in the
field of (classical) communication complexity as a practical mechanism for solving the equality problem in
a distributed framework, i.e. for discerning if two separate distant bit strings x and y are effectively the
same string. Figure 1 sketches a general two-user fingerprinting protocol. In this two-user framework, the
particular Boolean function can be simply defined as
f(x, y) =
{
0 if x = y,
1 if x 6= y. (1)
Obviously, the two users Alice and Bob together with the referee can always trivially achieve the goal of
computing (1) by communicating to the referee the entire N -bit inputs x and y. However, if they choose
instead to send fingerprints F (x) and F (y) of the original inputs x and y, they can always succeed with a
sought reduced communication cost when an arbitrarily small probability of error is tolerated. We remark
that, according to our notation, F (x) (and analogously F (y)) may refer to both classical or quantum cases.
In a classical protocol, fingerprint F (x) consists of a bit string shorter than x that may be computed as
a hash function. Conversely, in the quantum case, F (x) represents a bit string longer than x that is then
encoded and transmitted as qubits in the form of quantum states, which are ultimately quantum-processed
by the referee. In particular, optimal classical fingerprinting protocols are known to require fingerprints of at
least Ω(
√
N) bits [26, 27], which is a fundamental lower bound. By sending quantum states, in comparison,
Alice and Bob may, under certain conditions, require fingerprints of just O(log2N) qubits to solve the
same problem subject to an identical probability of error as in the classical protocol, which represents an
exponential reduction [12, 15]. The direct comparison between bits and qubits is fully justified by virtue of
Holevo’s theorem [30], which establishes that M -bit classical messages cannot be encoded into, and then
decoded from, quantum messages comprising less than M qubits.
Besides the achievable quantum supremacy in the field of communication complexity, research in QF was
also sparked by some other relevant attainments that quantum fingerprints can bestow but are beyond the
scope of this document. In particular, QF was also applied to construct a theoretic quantum automaton with
an exponential improvement in size when compared to a classical randomized automaton [31, 32]. Another
application consists of utilizing QF as a proposed cryptographic hash function [33]. Finally, as an eventual
application already noted in [15], QF may also play a pivotal role improving certain extant schemes for
quantum digital signatures in [34,35].
The first successful experimental demonstrations of QF protocols were reported in [21–23] and they
consisted of distributed implementations of the equality problem (1). A downside of all these initial
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Fig. 1: Schematic illustration of a general two-user fingerprinting protocol. The represented scheme is applicable to both
classical and quantum protocols. Alice and Bob receive, or already possess in their custody, raw classical binary
inputs x and y, respectively, comprising messages of N bits. They apply a certain mathematical function F (·)
to their respective bit strings x and y. The binary outputs of this function represent M -bit fingerprints that
both users encode as quantum or classical information. The referee receives the incoming signals from Alice and
Bob and, after applying a certain classical or quantum procedure, concludes whether the original N -bit sequences
coincide or differ.
experimental efforts lies in the fact that their fingerprint states must be extremely entangled, even when the
input size N is small. These experimental demands greatly surpass those that are achievable with current
technology, except when restricting the transmitted information to a few qubits per user. Therefore, their
current practical interest is very limited. A different approach for implementing quantum fingerprinting was
proposed in [24,25]. However, these other theoretical approaches demand the preparation of quantum states
of fixed photon number, which is still a challenging task from the experimental point of view [36]. Recently,
another innovative theoretical proposal for a QF protocol that is suitable to be implemented with present-day
technology without requiring entanglement was published in [15]. In this avant-garde protocol, Alice and
Bob send coherent states of low amplitude that the referee interferes in a balanced beamsplitter. On the basis
of this protocol, a pioneering proof-of-principle implementation that needs to send less information than the
best-known classical protocol [26] was reported in [16]. However, this experiment in [16] employs an improved
referee strategy tacitly accompanied by numerical techniques for its analysis, instead of the original analytical
method in [15]. Finally, a recent further enhanced version of the experiment in [16] was detailed in [17]. This
enhanced experimental setup makes use of ultralow-noise SNSPDs (superconducting nanowire single-photon
detectors) and it beats not only the best-known classical protocol but also the classical theoretical limit
discussed in [26,27].
As our main contribution, the present work is focused on extending the two-user coherent-state QF
protocol in [15] to multiple users (K ≥ 2), including the essence of all the aforementioned enhancements
advocated in [16, 17]. In particular, our K-party proposal retains the analytical character of the two-party
methods in [15] while also preserving the benefits of the improved referee’s rules in [16, 17]. Just for the
sake of clarity, in the general K-party framework for the equality problem, each user receives a binary input
sequence xk, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K. They then send to the referee node their respective fingerprints F (xk) encoded
as either classical or quantum information. The referee’s task is to determine if all the original K inputs xk
are the same or not, as sketched in figure 2. Our proposed extension of coherent-state QF for more than two
users has many noteworthy implications of intrinsic importance in the study of quantum networks. First,
the communication cost analysis of our extended QF protocol can be directly compared to results that exist
for an analogous classical K-user protocol [37], which are of pragmatic interest in the field of distributed
computational algorithms involving multiple users. Either in the classical or in the quantum case, the main
goal ultimately consists of minimizing the required energy expenditures, which are related to the amount
of transmitted information. Furthermore, our work represents a contribution towards the comprehension of
multi-user quantum networks, in similar fashion as other unrelated recent proposals such as [38, 39], which
are committed to introduce multipartite QKD (quantum key distribution) protocols that entail a central
network node. Finally, since it is accepted that QCC is connected to some foundational aspects of quantum
mechanics [14, 15], our work may also have an impact in helping to expand the knowledge related to some
underlying physical phenomena present in the quantum world. This fundamental knowledge includes, as
an example, the per-user information-carrying capacity of a quantum channel, and the relationship between
multipartite entanglement and nonorthogonality.
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Fig. 2: Schematic of a generalized fingerprinting protocol consisting of K users, or parties. Every user receives, or already
owns, a raw N -bit sequence xk, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Afterwards, each party transmits signals that encode M -bit
fingerprints F (xk), as either classical or quantum information. By processing the incoming signals, the referee
establishes whether the original binary strings xk are coincident to each other, or whether at least one of them is
different from the rest of strings.
Before concluding this introduction, we present the structure of the document’s remainder, and, at
the same time, we also introduce some other accompanying prominent contributions of this work. The
rest of the document starts briefly describing in section 2 the groundwork basics of coherent-state quantum
fingerprinting. Most of these preliminaries are essential to become acquainted with notation and concepts
used later in the subsequent development of our QF extension. Section 3 provides various linear-optics
innovative generalizations of the ordinary 50:50 beamsplitter concept that thus far was used for the two-
user protocols in previous works [15–17]. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of our multi-user quantum
fingerprinting protocol, presenting various suitable referee strategies and making use of the new generalized
circuit designs exposed in the preceding section. In this section 4, we also introduce original analytical
upper bounds on the amount of transmitted quantum information. Resembling the two-user bounds in [15],
but unlike the numerical methods employed in [16, 17], our novel bounding method is entirely analytical in
nature. This fact allows us to compute with a low computational cost upper bounds on the amounts, per
user, of both transmitted qubits and energy. Remarkably, these new analytical bounds may be applied, as a
particular case, to the conventional two-user setup in [16,17]. Further, another relevant feature is that they
can be easily used in an experimental setting, just by taking a few preliminary measurements in the classical
optical regime. Next, section 5 compares our multi-user protocol with the best-known analogous classical
protocol described in [37], and with the classical limit deduced in this manuscript’s appendices. Importantly,
we assess in this section the protocol resilience against experimental errors, and prove that the quantum
protocol can beat, under certain circumstances, the best-known classical protocol and the classical limit. In
closing the regular part of the manuscript, the last section is committed to present main conclusions and
future work perspectives. In addition, the paper contains three appendices as well. A detailed list of symbols
used in the paper is exposed in appendix A. Regarding appendix B, it includes exhaustive mathematical
derivations of all the upper bounds in section 4. Finally, the multi-party classical limit used in section 5 is
derived in appendix C.
2. Fundamentals of coherent-state quantum fingerprinting
Besides introducing relevant notation, this section contains an abridged description, including some novel
explanatory contributions, of the two-user coherent-state protocol proposed in [15], which was later adapted
with improvements for the experimental deployments in [16,17]. Hereof, as a requirement inherited from all
the other preceding QF protocols in [12,21–25], this protocol demands the users to apply an error-correcting
code (ECC) for the sole purpose of amplifying the Hamming distance between the input bit strings of
Alice and Bob1. An ECC can be mathematically modelled as a function E : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}M such that
1 For example, if the original inputs x and y perfectly match except for one single bit, then the ECC will output binary strings
that differ in a much larger number of bits. Unlike traditional applications of ECC in digital communication systems, only the
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E(x) is the so-called codeword associated with Alice’s input x. Ultimately, Alice encodes E(x) as quantum
information that she transmits through her channel; the description on Bob’s side is analogous. The ratio
between the lengths of E(x) and x is called the rate of the ECC and it is defined in this work as c = MN > 1.
Another important parameter of the ECC is the minimum Hamming distance between any two different
codewords. Related to this ECC distance, we define an ECC parameter δ that designates the maximum
fraction of bits in which any two codewords E(x) and E(y), satisfying the requirement E(x) 6= E(y), have
the same bit values. As a consequence, the minimum distance of the ECC can be simply computed using
δ as (1− δ)M . Without any loss of generality, we assume, just as in all the previous works on the subject,
that an entire N -bit input x can always be mapped by the ECC into an M -bit codeword E(x). If this were
not the case, the same statistical behaviour studied in this paper could be reproduced by slicing the input
bit strings into smaller blocks.
The coherent-state QF protocol, as noted above, overcomes all the implementation issues present in
earlier QF proposals and it makes quantum fingerprinting practical with current technology. In lieu of
requiring either entangled states or a fixed number of photons, Alice and Bob each send a so-named “coherent
state in the fingerprint mode” [15]. This coherent fingerprint state can be rigorously defined for Alice as
|α〉x = Dx (α) |0〉, where α is a complex number and Dx (α) = exp
(
αa†x − α∗ax
)
is the displacement operator
corresponding to the annihilation operator ax =
1√
M
∑M
m=1 (−1)E(x)mbm. Each term in this summation
represents a time-bin mode; furthermore, bm, with 1 ≤ m ≤ M , denotes the annihilation operator of the
mth mode and E(x)m is the mth bit in codeword E(x). The signal states on Bob’s side are analogous,
replacing x with y. Elementary calculation leads to a simple equivalent expression of the signal states as a
train of M weak coherent pulses:
|α〉x =
M⊗
m=1
∣∣∣∣(−1)E(x)m α√M
〉
m
. (2)
The total mean photon number corresponding to the entire train of pulses is µ = |α|2, whereas the mean
photon number per each individual pulse in the sequence is µpulse =
µ
M . It is worth noting that all the
coherent states that form together the fingerprint state (2) have the same amplitude, but their individual
phases that encode the information are determined by the specific binary codeword E(x), which itself depends
on the particular raw input string x.
In the two-user coherent-state QF protocol, the referee must rely on a quantum measurement to verify
if the phases of pairs of arriving pulses are equal or different. A simple practical way of implementing such
a measurement involves a standard balanced beamsplitter wherein the incoming individual pulses interfere
as depicted on figure 3. In the ideal case, whenever a click is recorded on the output detectors, the referee
unambiguously knows whether the phases in a pair of incoming pulses are the same or not. It must not
escape our notice that, in order to produce a correct interference at the referee’s beamsplitter, Alice and Bob
need a certain method for establishing a common phase reference. This phase reference may be established
before starting the protocol itself or, alternatively, the referee can incorporate phase-locking techniques into
her setup. In fact, this latter alternative may be implemented by exploiting different practical methods
already developed in [40–42] within the mature field of quantum key distribution (QKD).
For the sake of an easy generalization to multi-user instances in this document, we label the two-user
protocol detectors as “1” and “2”. By convention, a click in detector “1” reveals lack of relative parity in
the two phases, whereas a click in detector “2” indicates that the two phases are coincident. In this manner,
we can now summarize the basic coherent-state QF protocol steps in an ideal implementation:
(i) Alice and Bob agree to use a common ECC and a common value of α.
(ii) They prepare coherent fingerprint states |α〉x and |α〉y using their respective input sequences x and y
according to the quantum state in (2).
(iii) Both parties send these pulse trains to the referee through their respective quantum channels.
(iv) The referee interferes the individual pulses using a standard 50:50 beamsplitter and she announces that
the original inputs x and y are different, i.e. f(x, y) = 1, if and only if at least one click is observed
encoding part of the ECC implementation is used in quantum fingerprinting protocols, not the decoding part.
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Fig. 3: Illustration of a two-user coherent-state quantum fingerprinting protocol. Alice and Bob each send a sequence of
M weak coherent pulses whose phases (0 or pi) are modulated according to codewords of an error correcting code
(ECC). These codewords are determined depending on the raw binary inputs Alice and Bob want to fingerprint.
The incoming individual pulses interfere in a standard 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) located at the referee’s circuit. By
observing at least one of the two detectors and counting its clicks, the referee infers if the two complete trains
of coherent states from Alice and Bob are either the same or different. In an ideal implementation, one of the
detectors may only fire if two incoming individual pulses are equal, and the other detector may only fire if two
incoming individual pulses are different.
in detector “1”. As is apparent from this last statement, it suffices for the referee to observe just one
detector when the analysis is constrained to an ideal (defectless) implementation2.
In the absence of experimental imperfections, such as a flawed beamsplitter or dark counts in the
detectors, the referee always announces the correct outcome f(x, y) = 0 with certainty, whenever the original
inputs of Alice and Bob are equal, i.e. x = y. This errorless referee behaviour for the case x = y is due
to the fact that the only possible detector responses are either clicks in detector “2” only or no clicks at
all in both detectors. For the other case x ̸= y, error probability perror is the same as the probability of
obtaining no clicks in detector “1”. In particular, after the individual pulses interfere in the ideal referee
beamsplitter, independently of their relative phases, there will always be a coherent state
∣∣∣±√2 α√
M
⟩
going
into one detector and the vacuum entering the other detector. The click probability is calculated from the
Poissonian statistics of the coherent states as pclick = 1 − exp
(
−2 |α|2M
)
. Accordingly, the worst-case error
probability is simply perror = (1− pclick)(1−δ)M , because the minimum amount of pulses that may potentially
produce clicks in detector “1” is (1− δ)M , as dictated by the distance of the ECC. Introducing into this last
equality the above expression of pclick and then solving for |α|2, we obtain
|α|2 = 1
2(1− δ) ln
(
1
perror
)
. (3)
This equation in (3) provides the minimum mean photon number of each entire train of pulses that is needed
to get a desired error level in the referee outcomes, in the ideal case. Notice that this minimum value of
the total mean photon number |α|2 depends exclusively on the error probability and on the chosen ECC.
Under the ideal premises considered so far, for fixed perror and δ, mean photon number |α|2 remains constant
regardless of the raw message length N of Alice’s and Bob’s binary inputs. Also, we bring into attention
that no mathematical approximations were invoked in this work in order to obtain (3).
Up to this point, we have considered an ideal scenario only; however, any practical QF implementation
will inevitably be affected by experimental imperfections. These imperfections render unusable, or at least
highly impractical, the decision rule presented above. This is so because detector “1” may fire even if the
individual input pulses at the beamsplitter are equal. Nonetheless, in case of small imperfections, we may
expect the total number of clicks registered in “1” when x ̸= y to be much larger than when x = y. Similarly,
we presume the opposite behaviour for detector “2”, regarding the number of clicks for the respective cases
x ̸= y and x = y. Exploiting these statistical behaviours in the detectors, different decision rules can be
contrived to make the QF protocol robust to experimental errors. Particularly, the rule proposed in [15]
is based on calculating a fraction of clicks f2 =
D2
D1+D2
, where Dk is the total number of clicks in detector
2 Even in nonideal realistic implementations, just one detector is enough as is explained next. Nonetheless, the pioneering
referee rules in [15] demand observing two detectors in the realistic case (and just one detector in the ideal one).
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The incoming individual pulses interfere in a standard 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) located at the referee’s circuit. By
observing at least one of the two detectors and counting its clicks, the referee infers if the two complete trains
of coherent states from Alice and Bob are either the same or different. In an ideal implementation, one of the
detectors may only fire if two incoming individual pulses are equal, and the other detector may only fire if two
incoming individual pulses are different.
in detector “1”. As is apparent from this last statement, it suffices for the referee to observe just one
detector when the analysis is constrained to an ideal (defectless) implementation2.
In the absence of experimental imperfections, such as a flawed beamsplitter or dark counts in the
detectors, the referee always announces the correct outcome f(x, y) = 0 with certainty, whenever the original
inputs of Alice and Bob are equal, i.e. x = y. This errorless referee behaviour for the case x = y is due
to the fact that the only possible detector esponses are either clicks in detector “2” only or no clicks at
all in both detectors. For the other case x 6= y, error probability perror is the same as the probability of
obtaining no clicks in detector “1”. In particular, after the individual pulses interfere in the ideal referee
beamsplitter, independently of their relative phases, there will always be a coherent state
∣∣∣±√2 α√
M
〉
going
into one detector and the vacuum entering the other detector. The click probability is calculated from the
Poissonian statistics of the coherent states as pclick = 1 − exp
(
−2 |α|2M
)
. Accordingly, the wors -case error
probability is simply perror = (1− pclick)(1−δ)M , because the minimum amount of pulses that may potentially
produce clicks in detector “1” is (1− δ)M , as dictated by the distance of the ECC. Introducing into this last
equality the above expression of pclick and then solving for |α|2, we obtain
|α|2 = 1
2(1− δ) ln
(
1
perror
)
. (3)
This equation in (3) provides the minimum mean photon number of each entire train of pulses that is needed
to get a desired error level in the referee outcomes, in the ideal case. Notice that this minimum value of
the total mean photon number |α|2 depends exclusively on the error probability and on the chosen ECC.
Under the ideal premises considered so far, for fixed perror and δ, mean photon number |α|2 remains constant
regardless of the raw message le gth N of Alice’s and Bob’s binary inputs. Also, we bring into attention
that no mathematical approximations were invok d in this work in order t obt in (3).
Up to this point, we have con idered an ideal scenario only; however, any practical QF implementation
will inevitably be affected by experimental imperfections. These imperfections render unusable, or at least
highly impractical, the decision rule presented above. This is so because detector “1” may fire even if the
individual input pulses at the beamsplitter are equal. Nonetheless, in case of small imperfections, we may
expect the total number of clicks registered in “1” when x 6= y to be much larger than when x = y. Similarly,
we presume the opposite behaviour for detect r “2”, regardin the number of clicks for the res ective cases
x 6= y and x = y. Exploiting these statistical behaviours in the detectors, different decision rules can be
contrived to make the QF protocol robust to experimental errors. Particularly, the rule proposed in [15]
is based on calculating a fraction of clicks f2 =
D2
D1+D2
, where Dk is the total number of clicks in detector
2 Even in nonideal realistic implementations, just one detector is enough as is explained next. Nonetheless, the pioneering
referee rules in [15] demand observing two detectors in the realistic case (and just one detector in the ideal one).
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k = 1, 2 for the entire quantum pulses from Alice and Bob. Applying Hoeffding’s inequality [43] under this
rule, an analytical expression analogous to (3), but including the effects of imperfections, was deduced in [15].
Though valid, this referee strategy in [15] was found in [16] to be extremely sensitive to small variations in
the parameters that quantify the errors caused by imperfections, which hinders its experimental applicability.
The improved referee strategy proposed in [16] for coping with experimental errors takes into
consideration the amount D1 only; no fraction of clicks is needed, unlike the other rule mentioned above.
This referee strategy consists on using a threshold value r such that outcome f(x, y) = 1 is announced if and
only if D1 > r is observed. The value of r is defined as ensuring the equality perror|x=y = perror|x 6=y, with
perror | x=y = Pr
(
DE1 > r
)
and perror | x 6=y = Pr
(
DD1 ≤ r
)
. In these two probabilities, DE1 (D
D
1 ) represents
the random variable that models the number of clicks at output “1” when the entire input sequences are equal
(different). The value of r may be numerically computed by approximating the numbers of clicks DE1 and D
D
1
by binomial distributions, and then computationally looking up in inverse distribution tables. In particular,
the binomial distributions that include imperfection effects may be defined as DE1 ∼ Bin
(
M,pEclick,1
)
and
DD1 ∼ Bin
(
M, (1− δ)pDclick,1 + δ pEclick,1
)
, where pEclick,1 and p
D
click,1 are the probabilities of detector “1” firing
for the cases of equal and different individual input pulses, respectively. These probabilities are given by
pEclick,1 = 1− exp
(
−2(1− v)|α|
2
M
)
+ pdark, (4a)
pDclick,1 = 1− exp
(
−2v|α|
2
M
)
+ pdark. (4b)
In these two equations above, pdark is the dark count probability and v is the visibility, which quantifies
the actual contrast of the interferometer. We emphasize that the traditional definition of interferometric
visibility (also known as fringe contrast ; see, for example, page 12 of [44]) commonly used in optics and
quantum photonics is not the same that applies in the present case for v. Also, even though visibility v
is extensively utilized in [15–17], a concise definition is lacking in these references. Here, we provide such
a definition for the two-user case, which later in the manuscript is extended to K users with an arbitrary
K ≥ 2:
v =
1
2
(
1 +
gD1 − gE1
2
)
. (5)
This last equation contains the equal-input gain gE1 =
MµE1
|α|2 , which can be expressed as the ratio of the
mean photon number µE1 at output “1” and the nominal photon number
|α|2
M at each input. The other gain
gD1 =
MµD1
|α|2 is analogously defined, but for the case of different inputs, i.e. when the phases of two incoming
pulses are dissimilar. The fundamental reason why v is defined here in terms of photonic gains is to promote
an easy experimental estimation through measurements in the classical optical regime, actually even before
starting the protocol itself. In general, for the two-user case only, the relationships between v and the gains
are clearly gD1 = 2v and g
E
1 = 2(1− v).
Using all the above notation in this section, we sketch next a computational iterative algorithm for
numerically calculating both r and |α|2, assuming the same statistical model and protocol rules introduced
in [16]. This numerical algorithm, or another equivalent algorithm that produces the same results in [16,17],
is not explicitly detailed in these references, but we include it in this document in order to facilitate the
comparison with our analytical method that requires neither numerical iterations nor solving nonlinear
equations. In the algorithm stated below, F−1Bin denotes the binomial inverse cumulative distribution function,
which can be calculated, for instance, using the BinoInv function available in Matlab R©.
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Algorithm 2.1. (Computational method for calculating r and |α|2 in a realistic two-user coherent-state
QF protocol)
(1) Fix ECC parameter δ, ECC rate c = M/N , dark count probability pdark, visibility v, input size N and target
value of perror . Also, fix, as initial value, |α|2 = 0.
(2) Compute rE = F
−1
Bin
(
1− perror, M, pEclick,1
)
.
(3) Compute rD = F
−1
Bin
(
perror, M, [1− δ] pDclick,1 + δpEclick,1
)
− 1.
(4) If rD = rE, STOP, take threshold r = rD and keep as final result the current updated value of |α|2. If
rD < rE, increase |α|2 by a small amount ∆α and repeat (2) to (4). For input sizes N ≥ 10−5, such as
those considered in previous literature and in this work, an increment ∆α = 1, or even greater, is adequate
as typically |α|2 > 100.
Applying this algorithm, it can be shown that, in general, contrary to what happens for the ideal-case
solution in (3), the minimum required |α|2 is now no longer independent of M for a fixed perror. This
observation is apparent from the results in [16,17]. However, for input sizes below a certain value of M that
strongly depends on pdark, it is also observed that the protocol is still able to countenance a constant |α|2
and concomitantly maintain the desired target error probability, as happens in the ideal scenario.
Prior to ending this explanation of the realistic two-user QF protocol, we note that, in any real
implementation, we must also take into consideration the effect of losses. To do so, we define a parameter
η that combines the effect of the overall losses present in the whole experiment, such as detector efficiencies
and losses in the quantum channel. The effect of η is equivalent to transforming state |α〉x in (2) into
another state
∣∣√ηα〉
x
, which can always be compensated just by increasing the total transmitted mean
photon number as |α|2 → |α|2η . Thus, the protocol exhibits robustness to losses, in the sense that the scaling
properties of |α|2 with respect to the rest of protocol parameters remain unchanged if losses rise.
As a concluding outline, we next formally summarize how to quantify the amount of transmitted
quantum information Q, measured in qubits. In order to do so, once |α|2 has been computed, the information
quantification draws upon the following upper bound. This bound is valid for any coherent-state QF protocol,
either ideal or realistic, and it can be plainly inferred from the demonstration of Theorem 1 contained in [15]:
Q =
(
|α|2 + ∆
)
log2
(
M + |α|2 + ∆− 1
)
+ log2 (2∆) [qubits/user].
[A good and simple approximation confirmed in many of our
simulation results plotted at log-log scale is: Q ≈ |α|2 log2 M . ]
(6)
In this upper bound, parameter ∆ must be minimized from the following non-linear inequality using a
numerical method, such as fzero in Matlab R©:
2e−|α|
2
(
e|α|2
|α|2 + ∆
)|α|2+∆
≤
(

2
)2
. (7)
The value of  in (7) is fixed and it may be understood as an indicator of the accuracy of (6). In our
simulations, following the same convention as in previous works, we take  = 10−6. This parameter  should
not be confused by any means with the error probability perror of the protocol, inasmuch as  refers solely
to the probability of getting a certain inaccurate result in a Q prediction given by (6) for any complete
realization of the QF protocol.
In concluding this section, we provide a brief discussion on the communication cost of the family of QF
protocols introduced here. On this subject, because M and N are linearly related by the ECC rate, the result
in (6) stipulates that the scaling properties of Q may be described as Q ∼ O(log2N) or, more precisely, as
Q ∼ O(|α|2 log2N), except for an arbitrarily small . For the discussion in progress, we must also consider,
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as explained in this section, that as long as perror stays set to a specific value, |α|2 remains constant and
independent of N in the ideal QF protocol. This statement is also true in the nonideal case for values of N
below a certain threshold that depends on imperfections. Consequently, taking for granted a constant mean
photon number, it is often found in the literature the recurring assertion that a coherent-state QF protocol
provides exponential savings in the transmitted information when compared to classical protocols, which in
turn require fingerprints of no less than Ω(
√
N) bits for a fixed error probability [26, 27]. We remark that,
even though this affirmation is factually true for a constant |α|2, it is still possible to achieve huge savings
even if, in order to maintain the desired target perror, imperfections force a variation of |α|2 as a function of
N . With regard to this assertion, we present in section 5 results that show improvements of several orders
of magnitude when compared to the best-known classical protocol, even under circumstances that make the
strict exponential savings unattainable.
3. Multi-party referee circuit designs
This section addresses the non-trivial task of extending the beamsplitter device concept to multiple users,
in such ways that our extended device circuits can then be used in the implementation of a QF protocol
analogous to the pioneering K-user classical protocol in [37]. The generalized optical circuits, for K ≥ 2
users, must drive the output photonic detectors in a manner that the clicks registered in these detectors
provide enough information for the referee. The referee’s task is then to conclude if at least one of the binary
sequences xk, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K, differs in at least a single bit when compared to the rest of the sequences.
Before introducing the beamsplitter generalization itself, we describe in essence the signal states that
interfere at the referee’s circuit. In this regard, we adopt the same phase-encoding scheme prescribed in earlier
two-user QF protocols that was previously detailed in section 2, which is based on transmitting coherent
states whose phase modulation is furnished by an error correcting code (ECC) [15–17]. Therefore, each of
the K users sends through the respective quantum channel a train of M weak coherent pulses characterized
by an adapted version of (2):
|α〉xk =
M⊗
m=1
∣∣∣∣(−1)E(xk)m α√M
〉
m
, (8)
where, in this case, label k, satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is assigned to identify each user and also each user’s
sequence xk. Again, E(xk)m tags the mth bit of an ECC codeword corresponding, on this occasion, to a
binary string xk.
Given that the generalized protocol involves K users transmitting via K separate channels, it seems
mandatory for the referee to employ an optical multiport device in which the number of inputs is K as well.
Moreover, we take into consideration the fact that circuits built with linear-optics elements, such as phase
shifters and beamsplitters, can always be described by means of a unitary matrix, and vice-versa, if the
number of outputs in the multiport is also K [45]. Specifically, restricting ourselves for now to an ideal and
lossless scenario, the family of multiport circuits in our proposal can be effectively represented by a general
unitary matrix in which one row contains the same element value repeated K times. Further, the rest of
this matrix’s rows have the trait of adding up to zero, as shown in (9). For descriptive purposes, we have
chosen in (9) an arbitrary row k as the only one that sums up to
√
K instead of zero:
UK =

u1,1 u1,2 · · · · · · · · · · · · u1,K
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
uk−1,1 uk−1,2 · · · · · · · · · · · · uk−1,K
1√
K
1√
K
1√
K
1√
K
1√
K
1√
K
1√
K
uk+1,1 uk+1,2 · · · · · · · · · · · · uk+1,K
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
uK,1 uK,2 · · · · · · · · · · · · uK,K

−−−−→∑K`=1 u1,` = 0
...
−−−−→∑K`=1 uk−1,` = 0
...
−−−−→∑K`=1 uk+1,` = 0
...
−−−−→∑K`=1 uK,` = 0
(9)
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If we assume monochromatic light with the same polarization in every input beam, the generic unitary
scattering matrix UK describes a classical-optics transformation that is performed on electric fields as
Eout = UKEin. Analogously, in quantum optics, matrix UK performs a transformation that linearly relates
the creation operators of the input modes to the corresponding operators of the output modes.
Let us assume, for now, that all the K detectors connected to the circuit output ports are, as the device
circuit itself, ideal. The only row adding up to
√
K in the unitary matrix above instinctively corresponds to
a multiport output that, in general, is entitled to yield clicks in any case whatsoever, i.e. we do not impose
any particular conditions on the individual K input phases. Conversely, the remaining K − 1 rows that sum
up to zero correspond to circuit outputs that cannot lead to clicks when the K incoming phases are the same.
Accordingly, our general multiport proposal consists of K − 1 output detectors that may produce clicks only
for the case of different inputs xk, and 1 output detector without restrictions. This latter detector is the
single one that may click if all the K individual input pulses that arrive at the referee multiport have the
same phase. It may also fire, however, when these phases differ. Thus, in order to summarize the decision
rule, the referee ideally announces that the bit sequences are different, i.e. f(x1, x2, . . . xK) = 1 (at least
one xk is dissimilar), if and only if she observes at least one click in the K − 1 detectors associated with
the zero-sum rows. The transition matrix in (9) may be understood as corresponding to a generalization
of a standard 50:50 beamsplitter, for a system described in a K-dimensional Hilbert space. Notice that a
standard 50:50 beamsplitter matrix is just a particular case in two dimensions. The schematic black-box
representation of a generic referee’s multiport is depicted in figure 4.
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Fig. 4: Operation of the referee’s optical multiport circuit, portrayed here as a “black box,” in a proposed general K-party
quantum fingerprinting protocol implemented with weak coherent pulses. Each party transmits a sequence of
coherent states
⊗M
m=1
∣∣∣± α√
M
⟩
m
whose phases are modulated following an identical procedure as in the two-user
coherent-state protocol. Under ideal assumptions, if all the K input pulses
⊗K
k=1
∣∣∣± α√
M
⟩
k
that arrive at the
referee from the users at a given moment have the same phase, just one of the K detectors may fire. On the
contrary, any detector may fire if at least one of these K input pulses is different.
Before concluding this section introduction, let us be clear about two details: (i) for a fixed K and
keeping into consideration not breaking the unitary condition, the matrix elements in the zero-sum rows
of (9) may be chosen in many distinct ways that lead to different multiport circuit designs; (ii) even if all
the elements in the unitary matrix are already fixed, diverse design rules can be applied that also produce
different multiport circuit implementations, all of them represented by the same matrix [45, 46]. Relatedly,
the rest of the chapter describes various circuit designs aimed at being used by the referee in the multi-party
QF protocol. Suboptimal designs (from the point of view of dealing with experimental imperfections) are
also presented in the chapter’s remainder, for a twofold reason: (i) for comparison purposes, and (ii) because
some of these designs, though not optimal, have some other interesting experimental benefits that we shall
discuss in brief.
l〉
〉
i
ff
ff
ff
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3.1. Generalized beamsplitter designs
Generalized beamsplitters, also called multiport beamsplitters or multiport interferometers, were first
formally addressed by Zeilinger et al in [47]. After this description, Reck et al released in [45, 46] the
first known systematic procedure for designing the corresponding device. This method takes a unitary
matrix characterization as starting point and then provides an optical network of two-input beamsplitters
and phase shifters that implements the unitary transformation. Interestingly, this design proposal was
later used in [48] in order to construct real experiments for testing diverse EPR correlations. In general, a
generalized beamsplitter with K input ports (and an equal number of output ports) is characterized by a
K ×K matrix UK built exclusively by taking powers of the Kth root of unity γK = exp (i 2piK ). Explicitly,
the matrix elements of UK are given by
uij =
1√
K
exp
[
i
2pi
K
(i− 1)(j − 1)
]
, i = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . ,K. (10)
It is immediate to check that UK is in fact a unitary matrix that, furthermore, satisfies all the requirements
in (9) concerning the family of multiport circuits in our proposal. This demonstration can be done by taking
into account the following manifest property of the roots of unity:
K∑`
=1
γ
(i−1)(`−1)
K γ
−(j−1)(`−1)
K = Kδij , where
γK = exp (i
2pi
K ) and δij is a Kronecker delta. Therefore, we can use the optical realizations of this kind of
matrices as a possible multi-party referee circuit.
Up to this date, just two systematic methods are known for the design of devices implementing the
transformation given by the characteristic matrix in (10) for any value of K. The method by Reck et al
in [45, 46] was devised in 1994, whereas the second known method was made available by Clements et al
in [49], nearly two decades later. Both methods are based on decomposing any unitary matrix as a product
of simpler matrices, each of which corresponds to a two-input unbalanced (generic) beamsplitter. Then, each
method’s decomposition leads to a different multiport design consisting of a regular mesh of beamsplitters
and phase shifters. We emphasize the fact that these design methods are universal in the sense that they
can provide optical circuit realizations not only for the specific generalized beamsplitter matrices considered
here but also for any unitary matrix.
The layout in figure 5 exemplifies a generalized beamsplitter for K = 4 inputs, obtained according to the
Reck design procedure. In general, for an arbitrary K, this design always leads to an optical circuit consisting
of a triangular layout, as in the particular one depicted here. In contrast, the corresponding Clements design
portrayed in figure 6 exhibits a different architecture for the photonic circuit, in which every input channel
meets its closest neighbour at the very first possible intersection.
Both designs chiefly require an identical number of K(K−1)2 beamsplitters in order to construct the
multiport device. However, Clements layout achieves a smaller optical depth, which, as per the exhaustive
comparative analysis in [50], is a key parameter highly correlated with errors caused by fabricative
imperfections and by optical losses inside the multiport. We define the optical depth parameter as the
maximum number of beamsplitters, i.e. counted by traversing the longest path across the multiport,
considering all paths from any input port to any output port. In particular, Clements design dispenses
an optical depth of K beamsplitters, whereas the depth intrinsic to Reck design is 2K − 3. As K grows, the
latter requires roughly twice the depth of the former design.
Even though Clements layout presents, in general, a superior error tolerance in any realistic operational
conditions, which is indeed extremely important for experimental implementations, Reck design can be
advantageous when using programmable circuits for fulfilling the unitary transformation. In particular,
configuring methods exist for the Reck design that can be applied to program integrated photonic chips,
without requiring a full characterization of the internal circuit components [51,52].
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Fig. 5: Example of generalized beamsplitter, implemented here following Reck design procedure for K = 4. Thick black
lines perpendicular to optical connections represent phase shifters. Power transmittances at each unbalanced
beamsplitter are denoted by t. 
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Fig. 6: Example of generalized beamsplitter, implemented according to Clements design procedure for K = 4. The phase
shifters marked inside the diagonal dashed enclosure may be transferred to the output ports, by modifying the
beamsplitter parameters following the procedure described in [49]. However, this transfer was not implemented
on the depicted diagram for simplicity and because it did not impact qualitative comparisons later presented in
this work.
3.2. Extendable design
As opposed to the generalized beamsplitter designs, which were already-known and we merely found a
new application for them, we start here presenting original multiport layouts specifically devised for our
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QF protocol proposal. For each of these novel designs, we first present our optical circuit realization
and then introduce the associated unitary matrix. We remark that the previously discussed Reck and
Clements procedures can also be applied to obtain valid designs corresponding to our newly introduced
unitary matrices. These designs, however, turn out to be far from optimal when compared with our own
specific circuits in terms of both number of beamsplitters and optical depths. Thus, we shall discard these
other designs in the upcoming discussions regarding our proposals.
As a first innovative design approach for producing novel referee circuit architectures, we present what
we call the extendable design. This proposed layout consists of a chain of K − 1 concatenated unbalanced
beamsplitters, epitomized by the sequence in figure 7. As per convention, we assign a label k, with 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
to each of them. A beamsplitter k contains the input of the quantum channel from user k, except for
beamsplitter k = 2, which also contains the input for the user with label k = 1. Moreover, each unbalanced
beamsplitter k is characterized by an individual power transmittance tk =
k−1
k .
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Fig. 7: General example, valid for any number of parties K, of our proposed extendable design. Power transmittances
are represented by t.
An obvious benefit of the extendable design lies in the fact that fingerprinting users can be added and
removed without requiring much effort to change the physical layout. For example, new users can be simply
added without affecting the extant part of the circuit already in use for the previous users. In return,
a serious drawback of this design arises from the asymptotic behaviour of the power transmittances. As
the number of users K increases, the required power transmittances tend to be close to 1 and very close
to each other. Consequently, in a realistic scenario, an important contribution of errors originating from
mismatched transmittances is to be expected. This effect can be also apparent from observing the generic
matrix coefficients in (11), which represent amplitude transmittances. The column and row indices for these
coefficients correspond respectively to the input and output channel labels on the schematic view in figure 7:
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3.3. Optimal design
In the following, we present an optical circuit topology that minimizes both the number of required
beamsplitters and the optical depth. We call this novel topology optimal design, albeit this designation
is, strictly speaking, a surmise based on the evidence provided by comparing with other known topologies.
This optimal design certainly has the minimum depth of all the circuit architectures devised in this work for
the multi-user coherent-state QF problem. We may conjecture that no other topology exists that achieves
the shortest possible optical depth and the smallest number of standard (two-input) unbalanced (generic)
beamsplitters for the problem under consideration.
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The objective of finding the optimal layout is motivated in order to reduce fabrication resources. In
other words, working with compact circuit designs that need just a few beamsplitters is a key factor for the
manufacture of planar waveguide photonic circuits. Additionally, internal propagation losses are reduced
when the optical depth is small, and the cumulative effect of errors caused by fabrication imperfections,
namely errors when setting the values of transmittances and phase shifts, is also expected to be lower for a
shorter optical depth [50].
For a fixed number of users K, the construction of the optimized topology starts by assigning an integer
label k = 1 . . . K to each user and then recursively allocating these labels into two groups. At each recursive-
division level, a beamsplitter corresponding to these two groups is then placed over the layout, beginning
with the highest level of the group division diagram, and forming a characteristic tree arrangement. A
simple self-explanatory example for K = 4 parties that only requires a certain type of 50:50 beamsplitters
is illustrated in figure 8. A more intricate but self-evident example, for the case K = 7, is contained in
figure 9. When the amount of labels at some division level is an odd number, as in this example for K = 7,
we employ the ceiling division in order to split the labels into two groups. Replacing the ceiling division
with integer division in the diagram is also acceptable; it would produce a different equivalent circuit with
another similar tree topology. Finally, for each level contained in the division diagram presented on the
figures’ left, the power transmittances corresponding to the unbalanced beamsplitters must be calculated
in the form of fractions obtained as the amount of labels in the first group over the total number of labels
in the two groups. The distinctive tree design generated using this method can be described by a unitary
matrix satisfying all the requirements in (9). In particular, the single matrix row in (9) that does not sum
up to zero corresponds here to the output with label 1 in the layouts on figures 8 and 9.
Multi-party quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 14
The objective of finding the optimal layout is motivated in order to reduce fabrication resources. In
other words, working with compact circuit designs that need just a few beamsplitters is a key factor for the
manufacture of planar waveguide photonic circuits. Additionally, internal propagation losses are reduced
when the optical depth is small, and the cumulative effect of errors caused by fabrication imperfections,
namely errors when setting the values of transmittances and phase shifts, is also expected to be lower for a
shorter optical depth [50].
For a fixed number of users K, the construction of the optimized topology starts by assigning an integer
label k = 1 . . . K to each user and then recursively allocating these labels into two groups. At each recursive-
division level, a beamsplitt corr sponding to these two groups is then placed over the layout, b inning
with the highest level of the group division diagram, and forming a characteristic tree rrangement. A
simple self-explanatory example for K = 4 parties that only requires a certain type of 50:50 beamsplitters
is illustrated in figure 8. A more intricate but self-evident example, for the case K = 7, is contained in
figure 9. When the amount of labels at some division level is an odd number, as in this example for K = 7,
we employ the ceiling division in order to split the labels into two groups. Replacing the ceiling division
with integer division in the diagram is also acceptable; it would produce a different equivale t circuit with
another similar tree top logy. Finally, for each l vel con aine in the division diagram presented on the
figures’ left, the power transmittances corresponding to the unbalance beamsplitters must be calculated
in the form of fractions obtained as the amount of labels in the first group over the total number of labels
in the two groups. The distinctive tree design generated using this method can be described by a unitary
matrix satisfying all the requirements in (9). In particular, the single matrix row in (9) that does not sum
up to zero corresponds here to the output with label 1 in the layouts on figures 8 and 9.
 
 
 
1         2         3         4 
BS 1,2 
1         2         3         4      
1,3
2 1
4 2
t = = 1,3
2 1
4 2
r = =
1+ceil(4/2)
BS 1,3 
BS 3,4 
1
π
π
2
3
2
1,3
1
2
t =
1,2
1
2
t =
3
BS 1,3 
π
4
4
BS 1,2 
3,4
1
2
t =
1
BS 3,4 
1,2
1
2
t =
1,2
1
2
r =
3,4
1
2
t =
3,4
1
2
r =
 
Fig. 8: Example of our optimal fingerprinting circuit design for K = 4 parties. In general, the circuit design follows a
tree structure obtained by recursively dividing into two groups the integer labels assigned to identify the players,
as exemplified on the accompanying diagram. r denotes power reflectance and t denotes power transmittance.
Taking into consideration the previously-explained optimal design procedure, we present comparative
results in table 1, where ⌈ log2K ⌉ is the ceiling function of log2K. This logarithmic function mathematically
arises from the circuit’s tree structure. The analytical comparisons with the rest of topologies clearly
show that our optimal design inherently provides enormous exponential savings in terms of optical depth.
Moreover, the reduction in the amount of required beamsplitters exhibits noteworthy quadratic savings when
compared to the generalized beamsplitter layouts generated according to the Reck and Clements procedures.
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Fig. 9: Example of our optimal fingerprinting circuit design for K = 7 parties. In general, the design consists of a tree
structure merely constructed by recursively dividing into two groups the integer labels allocated to the players. r
denotes power reflectance and t denotes power transmittance. The tree structure is not symmetrical if K is odd,
as it corresponds to the herein depicted explanatory example. Ceiling division (used in the represented example)
or integer division is required to divide the users into blocks. Beamsplitter power transmittances and reflectances
are easily calculated as fractions of total users that are included in each block, as recursively typified on the
accompanying diagram.
Table 1: Number of beamsplitters (BS’s) and optical depth in 4 referee optical circuit designs.
Design Number of beamsplitters Optical depth
Our optimal design K − 1 ⌈ log2K ⌉
Our extendable design K − 1 K − 1
Generalized BS with Clements design K(K−1)2 K
Generalized BS with Reck design K(K−1)2 2K − 3
In the absence of experimental data, we need a realistic theoretical imperfection model in order to
study how the referee multiport circuit behaves, depending on experimental imperfections, i.e. the losses
and the fabricative imperfections (fabrication noise) present in the circuit components. In the following, we
develop such a model for the optimal design that concerns us here; nonetheless, we note that this model can
straightforwardly be generalized to any multiport optical circuit. We first present a matrix decomposition,
in which the action of every generic beamsplitter upon the quantum states in the ideal circuit is described by
a matrix. Finally, based on this ideal matrix decomposition, we hand over the definitive model that contains
the parameters that allow for imperfections.
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The effect of each beamsplitter in the optimal design can be described by a unitary matrix expressed as
follows:
UBS,IDEAL =

1 0
0 1
. . . √
t 0 0
√
1− t
0 1 0 0
. . .
0 0 1 0
−√1− t 0 0 √t
. . .
1 0
0 1

, (12)
where matrix size is K × K and the indices of the off-diagonal elements correspond to the labels of the
input and output channels of each beamsplitter in the design. Also, t tags the power transmittance of the
considered beamsplitter. For example, for the layout in figure 8, the matrix decomposition can be expressed
as
U4 =

√
t1,3 0
√
1− t1,3 0
0 1 0 0
−√1− t1,3 0 √t1,3 0
0 0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS 1,3
.

√
t1,2
√
1− t1,2 0 0
−√1− t1,2 √t1,2 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS 1,2
.

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0
√
t3,4
√
1− t3,4
0 0 −√1− t3,4 √t3,4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS 3,4
,
and the corresponding unitary matrix that describes the entire optimal circuit in figure 8, for K = 4, is
U4 =

1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
− 1√
2
1√
2
0 0
− 12 − 12 12 12
0 0 − 1√
2
1√
2
 .
Similarly, for the case K = 7 depicted in figure 9, we can write the decomposition as
U7 =

√
t1,5 0 0 0
√
1 − t1,5 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
−
√
1 − t1,5 0 0 0
√
t1,5 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS 1,5
.

√
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√
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0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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
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.
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√
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BS 5,7
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√
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
︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS 3,4
.

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
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√
t5,6
√
1 − t5,6 0
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√
1 − t5,6
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
︸ ︷︷ ︸
BS 5,6
,
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and the resulting matrix for the complete circuit is
U7 =

1√
7
1√
7
1√
7
1√
7
1√
7
1√
7
1√
7
− 1√
2
1√
2
0 0 0 0 0
− 12 − 12 12 12 0 0 0
0 0 − 1√
2
1√
2
0 0 0
− 3
2
√
21
− 3
2
√
21
− 3
2
√
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− 3
2
√
21
2√
21
2√
21
2√
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0 0 0 0 − 1√
2
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2
0
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− 1√
6
√
2
3

.
In order to finally include the effects of imperfections in the matrix decomposition, we first need to
closely analyze how the generic beamsplitters are implemented in a real photonic circuit. The conventional
way for achieving a general optical realization, totally equivalent to a generic beamsplitter, consists of a
basic building block, comprising a Mach-Zehnder interferometer built with two cascaded symmetric 50:50
beamsplitters and two phase shifters [45,46,49,50]. For the particular case of our optimal design, this basic
building block can be implemented as illustrated in figure 10. The value of phase ω in the block is related
to the unbalanced power transmittance as t = sin2(ω), with ω ∈ [0, pi/2].
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Fig. 10: Implementation of each unbalanced beamsplitter (BS) in our optimal circuit design (see, for instance, figures
8 and 9), for any pair of port labels in the design ℓmin, ℓmax ∈ [1,K] , ℓmin < ℓmax. As depicted within this
figure, two symmetric 50:50 BS’s and two phase shifters are used to mimic the behaviour of any unbalanced
BS. In other different circuit designs, the unbalanced BS’s may also be implemented in a similar manner. Phase
ω is related to the unbalanced BS power transmittance as ω = arcsin (
√
t). According to our design notation
convention, phase pi, depicted on the equivalent unbalanced BS (on the right part of this figure), always goes,
upon reflection, from the smallest integer label ℓmin to the greatest integer label ℓmax in any general circuit tree
structure, as it is clearly exemplified in figures 8 and 9.
Exploiting the model in figure 10, the ideal matrix associated to each generic beamsplitter in our design
can be further decomposed as
UIDEAL =
(
0 1
1 0
)
·
(
1√
2
i√
2
i√
2
1√
2
)
·
(
ei(ω+pi) 0
0 e−iω
)
·
(
1√
2
i√
2
i√
2
1√
2
)
=
=
(
sin(ω) cos(ω)
− cos(ω) sin(ω)
)
=
( √
t
√
1− t
−√1− t √t
)
,
(13)
i . : I l t ti f l s litt r ( ) i r ti l ir it si (s , f r i st , fi r s
), f r ir f rt l ls i t si ` i , ` [ , ] , ` i ` . s i t it i t is
fi r , t s tri : ’s t s s ift rs r s t i i t i r f l
. I t r iff r t ir it si s, t l ’s ls i l t i si il r r. s
is r l t t t l r tr s itt s i t . r i t r si t ti
ti , s pi, i t t i l t l t ri t rt f t is fi r , l s s,
r fl ti , fr t ll t i t r l l ` i t t r t t i t r l l ` i r l ir it tr
tr t r , it i l rl lifi i fi r .
l i i l i fi , i l i i i li i i
f
I ·
i
i ·
i( pi)
i ·
i
i
i
i
,
Multi-party quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 18
where, for simplicity, we only represent the matrix elements whose indices belong to the non-zero off-diagonal
elements in (12). Flip matrix
(
0 1
1 0
)
in (13) is simply for accommodating the output channel labels to those
in our design, as typified in figures 8 and 9. Both matrices
(
1√
2
i√
2
i√
2
1√
2
)
correspond to standard symmetric
beamsplitters, commonly used in quantum optics. Finally, matrix
(
ei(ω+pi) 0
0 e−iω
)
in (13) models the shifters,
characterized by a phase value ω in figure 10.
In order to accurately simulate fabricative imperfections and losses, we follow a Monte Carlo method
similar to that in [50], in which the ideal matrix decomposition in (13) is replaced with an analogous
expression that includes various parameters that quantify imperfection levels:
UREALISTIC =
(
0 η2BS
η2BS 0
)
·
(
τ1 i
√
1− τ21
i
√
1− τ21 τ1
)
·
·
(
ei(ω+pi+σP·randn) 0
0 ei(−ω+σP·randn)
)
·
(
τ2 i
√
1− τ22
i
√
1− τ22 τ2
)
,
with τ1, τ2 = 2
−1/2(1 + σT · randn).
(14)
The losses associated to each symmetric beamsplitter are denoted by ηBS; we assume in (14) that both
beamsplitters in figure 10 undergo identical losses, even though this restriction may be straightforwardly
worked around. The ideal amplitude transmittance 1√
2
is now substituted in (14) with its realistic equivalent
τ1, τ2 = 2
−1/2(1 +σT · randn), where each of the subscripts 1, 2 corresponds to a different 50:50 beamsplitter.
Parameter σT accounts for the fabrication noise level affecting the transmittances τ1,2, modelled as the
standard deviation of a zero-mean normal random variable [50]. Similarly, σP is the fabrication noise level
affecting the phase shifters present in the basic building block, also modelled as Gaussian noise [50]. We
remark that the four different random variables in (14), dubbed as randn, actually represent four different
realizations in a Monte Carlo simulation. To approach our analysis towards realistic values for the above
discussed imperfection parameters, we consider femtosecond laser writing as the reference technology used for
constructing the optical circuits. Additionally, we assume thermo-optic active control for the phase shifters.
Under this fabrication assumptions, it is currently possible to achieve tolerances of 0.01 for the amplitude
transmittances and 0.01 rad for the phase shifters [53,54], i.e. present-day fabricative technology permits to
describe all the imperfections by a single value as low as σT = σP = σ = 0.01. In consequence, for simplicity,
we shall use the same parameter σ to denote both phase and amplitude noise levels.
Finally, before concluding this section, we emphasize that the statistical imperfection model developed
here is fully independent from, but it can be combined with, the analytical method for upper-bounding
the transmitted information, which is introduced in section 4 for a realistic multi-party QF scheme. For
instance, the upper-bounding method explained in the next section may be applied in a real experiment
wherein, once the circuit topology is chosen and implemented, the imperfection model is irrelevant because
the performance results rely on measurements only.
4. Quantum fingerprinting protocol analysis
In this section, we provide a description of various decision rules that govern the referee announcements
in the multi-party QF protocol. Based on these rules, we develop the mathematical formalism for upper-
bounding both the required amount of abstract information and, importantly towards estimating resource
expenditures, also the energy consumption of the protocol. First, we analyze the multi-party ideal case,
which allows us to gain an initial insight into the protocol capabilities, in a similar fashion as the ideal
analysis carried out in section 2 for the well-known two-user case.
The second part of the section addresses the more interesting realistic scenario, in which we present
a method for upper-bounding the transmitted information that takes into account any kinds of circuit
imperfections, as well as the detector dark count rates. The application of this method relies on determining
certain gains that ultimately include the effects of all imperfections and losses present in the circuit. We
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present a comprehensive analysis of the method, emphasizing the effect of different parameters on the protocol
performance, but leaving for appendix B the mathematical details of the model, which is based on applying
a certain form of the Chernoff bounds to the click probabilities at the detectors.
Following the already-detailed general matrix characterization in (9) and the generic portrayal in figure 4,
which is applicable to every circuit design in section 3, we consider through this entire section that an integer
label k, satisfying 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is assigned so as to identify each output detector. However, in order to make
our analysis valid for any circuit without loss of generality, we introduce, from now on, the restriction that
label k = K always corresponds to the only detector that losses photons, in comparison with all-equal inputs,
when at least one of the input pulses differs from the rest. In other words, label k = K is allocated to the
only detector that may click in the ideal case when all the input states are the same. This specific photonic
detector corresponds to the row that does not add up to zero in (9). The restriction introduced here does
not pose any limitations on the circuit design, as it implies a relabeling of the exit ports, which, if applicable,
is equivalent to a mere permutation of the rows of the unitary matrix associated to the circuit.
4.1. Ideal scenario
Under ideal premises, the referee declares that at least one bit sequence xk is different, i.e. f(x1, x2, . . . xK) =
1, if and only if at least one click happens in the K − 1 detectors related to the zero-sum rows in matrix (9).
Therefore, an error never occurs if the K original binary inputs xk are the same. Otherwise, the worst possible
situation clearly always corresponds to just one user sending a coherent-state sequence
⊗M
m=1
∣∣∣± α√
M
〉
m
that
differs from the rest K − 1 users’ sequences. This situation is the most similar to K all-equal sequences of
coherent states and, hence, the most difficult to distinguish by the referee. Besides this, for the purpose of
carrying out the analytical calculations, the worst case takes place when the number of different coherent
states in the sequence that differs is at its minimum. This theoretical minimum is exactly (1 − δ)M as
imposed by the minimum distance of the used error correcting code, as detailed in section 2. Thus, we
obtain that error probability perror can be calculated as
perror =
K−1∏
k=1
(1− pDclick,k)
(1−δ)M
=
K−1∏
k=1
e−(1−δ)M ·µ
D
k
= exp
−(1− δ)M · K−1∑
k=1
µDk
 = exp(−4(1− δ)(K − 1)|α|2
K
)
,
(15)
with pDclick,k being the click probability at output detector k when just one individual input state differs from
the rest, and µDk being the corresponding mean photon number of the coherent state impinging this aforesaid
detector k. For the last equality, we have taken into account
K−1∑
k=1
µDk =
K · |α|2
M
− µDK =
K · |α|2
M
− (K − 2)
2 · |α|2
K ·M =
4(K − 1) · |α|2
K ·M , (16)
which can be proven multiplying matrix (9) by a vector filled with the same repeated value, except for a
single entry with an opposite phase. Finally, solving for |α|2 in (15),
|αideal|2 = K
4(1− δ)(K − 1) ln
(
1
perror
)
. (17)
Fixing a specific desired error probability, this latest calculation gives an upper-bound on the mean photon
number, and hence also on the energy required per user. The related amount of quantum information per
user, suitable to confront a classical protocol, can be directly calculated introducing (17) into (6). Again,
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as in the analysis for deriving (3) in section 2, here we did not draw upon mathematical approximations
concerning the intensity levels of the individual pulses. Also, we note that the known result given in (3) can
be seen as an exact particular case for K = 2, predicted by the novel generalization in (17).
A central observation can be made on (17) by noticing that, as the number of users K increases, the
effect of K tends to be less influential on the predicted per-user statistics. Further, we also note that the
particular circuit design implemented at the referee node is irrelevant under the ideal assumptions. Finally,
we bring attention to the fact that, as in the particular case for K = 2 anticipated in section 2, the raw
message length N (and, consequently, also the number of transmitted pulses M) has zero impact on |α|2.
4.2. Realistic scenario
In this subsection’s analysis, we account for any kinds of experimental errors, by means of our analytical
method for upper-bounding |α|2. Before entering the analysis, we present the referee decision rules upon
which the bounding method depends. The ideal-protocol decision rule in 4.1 is not applicable anymore
if subject to realistic constraints, owing to the reasons extrapolated from section 2. As alternatives, we
propose here two different referee strategies based on observing different ensembles of detectors attached to
the circuit’s exit ports. We shall show that either of these two separate rules leads, in general, to different
figures of merit when analyzing the QF protocol.
In one of the proposed strategies, the referee counts the number of clicks in the first K − 1 detectors,
labelled 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, which are the detectors that gain impinging photons when some of the input states
differ from the rest. Denoting as Dk the total number of clicks observed in every detector k during the entire
protocol execution, the referee infers equal sequences if and only if
∑K−1
k=1 Dk ≤ r. Parameter r is a certain
threshold, below which the outcome “equal inputs” is announced; we shall provide the details required to
calculate r using a closed-form expression. Above the value of r, i.e.
∑K−1
k=1 Dk > r, the referee concludes
that the input sequences are different.
The other proposed strategy consists of observing just one detector, labelled k = K. This is the single
detector that losses photons in the different-sequence situation when compared to the equal-sequence case,
under the normal circumstances that we shall mark off. Subject to this decision rule, the referee infers
that the input sequences are different if and only if DK ≤ r. Complementarily, she announces equal input
sequences if and only if DK > r.
In order to deduce the expressions for threshold r and the bounding limit for |α|2, we apply certain
types of Chernoff bounds. All the detailed calculations are included in appendix B, but we sketch next the
underlying statistical model. In particular, let XEk , with 1 ≤ k ≤ K, be a random variable with Bernoulli
distribution that accounts for the number of individual clicks (0 or 1 click) at detector k when K coherent
states arrive at the referee at the same time containing the same phase. In a similar fashion, XDk is an
analogous random variable for the case when some of the K input states are different (they contain phase
differences). An additional group of random variables X˜Dk,m is introduced in order to model the effect of the
differences present in the K complete sequences of M pulses
⊗M
m=1
∣∣±√µin〉m, as follows:
X˜Dk,m =
{
XDk for any (1− δ) ·M indices m,
XEk for any δ ·M indices m.
(18)
The baseline statistical model and the strategies introduced above imply that the referee always provides
an erroneous announcement in the following situations. If the referee uses the strategy that consists of
observing K−1 detectors, an announcement error happens either whenever the input sequences are actually
different and
∑K−1
k=1 D
D
k =
∑K−1
k=1
∑M
m=1 X˜
D
k,m ≤ r, or whenever the input sequences are actually equal to
each other and
∑K−1
k=1 D
E
k =
∑K−1
k=1
∑M
m=1X
E
k > r. In the same way, now under the referee’s rule of taking
into account just the clicks in detector k = K, an error occurs in the following two situations: whenever the
input sequences are really equal to each other and DEK =
∑M
m=1X
E
K ≤ r, or whenever they are different and
DDK =
∑M
m=1 X˜
D
K,m > r. We denote by p
E
error the probability of an error happening when the sequences sent
by the users are actually equal to each other. Similarly, pDerror is the analogous error probability for different
sequences. We remark that, in this work, probabilities pEerror and p
D
error are not the same as the desired target
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error probability, which we call perror. In particular, our specific manner of applying the Chernoff bounds
guarantees that pEerror, p
D
error ≤ perror. This is a key difference when comparing with all the methods for
calculating |α|2 in previous works [15–17], which always secure the equality pEerror = pDerror = perror (see, for
example, Algorithm 2.1 in this work). As we shall observe in detail, our more relaxed constraint may produce
upper-bounds that are not as tight as in the previously published methods. This strict lack of tightness is
the price that one has to pay in exchange for a closed-form expression for both r and |α|2 that is instructive
and easy to implement for computational purposes. Nonetheless, we shall observe in next section that, for
certain ranges of M , both approaches essentially yield the same predictions at the logarithmic scale.
Focusing now on the strategy in which the referee observes detectors from 1 to K − 1, and based on
the above statistical description, we get closed-form equations in appendix B.1 that depend on the following
two gains:
gE[1,K−1] =
K−1∑
k=1
µEk
µin
, 0 ≤ gE[1,K−1] ≤ K, (19a)
gD[1,K−1],P¯ =
K−1∑
k=1
µD
k,P¯
µin
, 0 ≤ gD[1,K−1],P¯ ≤ K, (19b)
where µEk represents the mean photon number at an output detector k when the K individual input pulses
have the same phase. Similarly, µD
k,P¯
accounts for the photon number when at least one of the K phases
of the individual input pulses is different from the rest. Gain gD
[1,K−1],P¯ depends on P¯ , which is a vector
whose elements are phase labels. As an explanatory instance, let us suppose that the referee receives pulses
from K = 4 users and that the individual input states are
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
. Then, in this
particular example, we have P¯ = (1,−1,−1, 1). In general, as P¯ corresponds to different input states, at
least 1 component in P¯ must have a different phase than the rest of components, i.e. P¯ 6= −~1,~1. We denote
by L the integer number that indicates the minimum amount of phase labels in P¯ that differ from the rest
K − L labels. In the previous example, we have L = 2. Restriction L ≤ K2 is imposed, because it is not
difficult to realize that values L > K2 introduce zero additional different cases, from the point of view of
photon statistics.
Assuming Kµin =
K|α|2
M  1, which we strictly verify later in the manuscript for the cases of interest,
the mathematical development in appendix B.1 gives the following analytical upper bound:
∣∣∣αbound[1,K−1]∣∣∣2 = 4q + 2
[
4q2 + 2(1− δ)2
(
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
)2
(K − 1)Mµdark · ln(1/perror)
]1/2
η (1− δ)2
(
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
)2 , (20a)
q =
[
δ · gE[1,K−1] + (1− δ) ·min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ )
]
· ln(1/perror), (20b)
Fingerprinting possible ⇔ min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ ) > gE[1,K−1]. (20c)
Parameter η in (20a) is the combined efficiency that includes the losses of the quantum channel and the
detector efficiencies. It does not include, however, the effects of the insertion losses for the beamsplitters,
because these are unbalanced losses corresponding to different paths across the multiport circuit. The effect
of beamsplitter losses is fully incorporated within the gains in (19). On another note, we shall clearly
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show later in this section that the minimization required for (20a) and (20b) can be accomplished just by
simulating (19b) for the K vectors P¯ that correspond to L = 1 and then taking the smallest of these K
simulated values of gD
[1,K−1],P¯ . This process is identical when the gains are measured in a real experiment.
We observe in (20a) that, unlike the ideal case, this bound depends on the number of input pulses
M . Further, we can also notice that the dark count rate µdark foists a strong influence that, moreover,
is aggravated when both M and the number of users K grow. This worsening consists of an increase
in the predicted mean photon number provided by (20a) and, hence, also in an increment of the energy
consumption per user. On a separate note, the condition in (20c) emerges from the core of the Chernoff
bounds themselves (see appendix B.1). This restriction is completely congruent with the desired behaviour
of the detectors attached to the exit ports, provided that the experimental error level in the circuit is low
enough. We may refer, therefore, to the restriction in (20c) as the “normal circumstances of operation”. To
conclude our commentaries about (20), we notice that, once |α|2 has been calculated according to (20a), it is
straightforward to compute the transmitted information, measured in qubits per user, just by applying the
result in (6). Most of the comments provided in this paragraph for the strategy involving K − 1 detectors
are also relevant for the other referee strategy considered in this work, with a few exceptions that we shall
note soon.
The referee threshold that corresponds to the rule analyzed so far is
r =
1
2
|α|2
[
(1 + δ) · gE[1,K−1] + (1− δ) ·min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ )
]
+ (K − 1)Mµdark. (21)
In the following, we move on to presenting the final results deduced in appendix B.2 for the other rule,
in which the referee takes into account detector k = K only. The governing gains for just one detector are
gEK =
µEK
µin
, 0 ≤ gEK ≤ K, (22a)
gDK,P¯ =
µD
K,P¯
µin
, 0 ≤ gDK,P¯ ≤ K. (22b)
Under the same assumptions as in the other decision rule, the bound is now
∣∣∣αboundK ∣∣∣2 = 4q + 2
[
4q2 + 2(1− δ)2
(
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
)2
Mµdark · ln(1/perror)
]1/2
η (1− δ)2
(
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
)2 , (23a)
q = gEK · ln(1/perror), (23b)
Fingerprinting possible ⇔ gEK > max(gDK,P¯ ). (23c)
An evident statement can be made by observing (23a) and comparing it with (20a). It is clear that, unlike the
rule with K−1 detectors, the effect of dark counts provided by µdark in (23a) is not directly worsened as the
number of users rises. However, as in the other rule, this effect of µdark is made worse by the action of M albeit
now not aggravated by K. Again, the condition imposed by the Chernoff bounds that enables fingerprinting
feasibility, summarized here in (23c), is in full agreement with our expected behaviour of detectors, as long
as a reasonable experimental error level is kept in the referee circuit. As occurs in the minimization for (20),
the maximization required for (23) is practicably achievable with near zero computational cost. Finally, the
Multi-party quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 23
Table 2: Feature comparison of 3 methods for estimating |α|2 in a realistic scenario.
Method No. of users No. of detectors observed Type of procedure for calculating |α|2
Proposed in this work K ≥ 2 1 or K − 1 Analytical (upper bound)
Xu’s [16] K = 2 1 Numerical
Arrazola’s [15] K = 2 2 Analytical (upper bound)
corresponding threshold for the referee strategy is given now by
r =
1
2
|α|2
[
(1 + δ) · gEK + (1− δ) ·max(gDK,P¯ )
]
+Mµdark. (24)
We have hitherto presented a method that allows us to compute upper bounds on |α|2, subject to a
maximum desired error level perror in any realistic case. Of course, this computation also depends on the
protocol parameters, such as K, M and δ, and on the physical characteristics and imperfections of the
photonic components (beamsplitters, detectors, etc). As an interesting remark, table 2 shows how previous
approaches compare to our innovative method, regarding various aspects: numbers of users considered in
the protocol, referee strategies, and the procedures for calculating the mean photon number.
In the rest of the manuscript, we pay a particular attention, amongst other aspects, to the figures of
merit (transmitted quantum information, amount of energy, etc.) computed when the raw input size N , and
consequently also M , is arbitrarily large. In particular, this regime corresponds to the situation in which the
term with M and µdark inside the square roots of (20a) and (23a) is the leading addend in the sum. This
assumption is specially relevant because it is very well known, from all the two-user coherent-state protocols
in [15–17], that the dark count rate is a dominant limiting factor as M grows, and identifying and mitigating
its effects is still a pressing issue. In our particular model, these premises make (20a) and (23a) more
dependent on the subtractions of gains
[
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
]
and
[
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
]
, respectively.
These gain differences thus become more relevant rather than the absolute levels of the gains. We point out
that this special devotion for the case of arbitrarily large M , however, does not imply, by any means, that we
are restricting our study to the limit of an infinite input size where the protocol operates in the asymptotic
regime.
For the referee strategy involving K − 1 detectors, a dominant term in M and µdark happens when
M 
2
[
δ · gE[1,K−1] + (1− δ) ·min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ )
]2
· ln(1/perror)
µdark(K − 1)(1− δ)2
(
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
)2 , (25)
and, for the strategy involving a single detector k = K, a dominant term happens when
M  2(g
E
K)
2 · ln(1/perror)
µdark(1− δ)2
(
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
)2 . (26)
Inasmuch as the quantities
[
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
]
and
[
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
]
become relevant, we may
easily provide K-party generalizations of the two-user visibility v in (5) that depend on these above-stated
subtractions. In this way, these visibility generalizations may be seen as additional figures of merit not only
for the quantum protocol by itself, but also with regards to choosing the best suitable design for the referee
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circuit. A different visibility generalization must be provided for each of the referee strategies analyzed in
this work:
v[1,K−1] =
1
2
1 + min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
min(gD,ideal
[1,K−1],P¯ )− g
E,ideal
[1,K−1]
 , vK = 1
2
1 + gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
gE,idealK −max(gD,idealK,P¯ )
 . (27)
These visibilities v[1,K−1] and vK extend (5) in such a way that they are calculated by taking the ratios
between the realistic gain differences and the ideal ones. Thus, using the fact that the ideal gain values are
min(gD,ideal
[1,K−1],P¯ ) =
4(K − 1)
K
, gE,ideal[1,K−1] = 0, g
E,ideal
K = K, max(g
D,ideal
K,P¯
) =
(K − 2)2
K
, (28)
we may eventually write
v[1,K−1] =
1
2
1 + K
[
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
]
4(K − 1)
 , vK = 1
2
1 + K
[
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
]
4(K − 1)
 . (29)
We provide in figure 11 graphical representations that show how the generalized visibilities v[1,K−1] and
vK vary with respect to the number of parties K, for the two groups of exit ports (k ∈ [1,K−1] and k = K)
considered in the referee’s decision rules. Two representative values σ = 0.01 and σ = 0.1 were selected for
the fabricative error-level parameter σ, introduced in (14) and in the subsequent explanation there. Either
of these two values can be accomplished with present-day optical circuit fabrication technology, as discussed
at the end of section 3. Losses per beamsplitter were chosen to be ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, which is a standard
value reported in contemporary experiments and practical implementations; see for example [49,55]. In the
context of this work, this value of ηBS is applicable to the symmetric 50:50 beamsplitters in figure 10, which
are used as the building blocks necessary to implement the generic unbalanced beamsplitters in the circuit
designs. The results plotted in figure 11 highlight the clear superiority of our optimal design, introduced
in subsection 3.3, when compared to the rest of circuit designs in section 3. Actually, this is not surprising
at all, judging by the exponential savings in optical depth displayed in table 1 for our optimal layout. A
small depth is extremely advantageous because the smaller the number of beamsplitters crossed by different
internal paths through the circuit, the less error level is carried into the photonic gains of (19) and (22).
In concluding this section, figure 12 contains various visibility plots calculated with different values of the
gains gD
[1,K−1],P¯ and g
D
K,P¯
obtained changing the number of input phases that differ. That is, calculated with
different sets of labels in vector P¯ . This variation in vector P¯ impacts the maximization and minimization
procedures required for (20) and (23), and also for the visibilities in (29). In particular, different values of
the relevant parameter L were chosen for the plots in figure 12. We recall that L ≤ K2 is the minimum
amount of phase labels in P¯ that differ from the rest K − L labels. It is easy to perceive in the plots that,
for realistic fabrication noise levels characterized by parameter σ, the worst case unequivocally corresponds
to L = 1. This observation is to be expected, as all these situations, where a single input phase (L = 1)
of the K individual pulses is different, are the most similar to the case of K identical phases. Accordingly,
in all these situations corresponding to L = 1, gain gD
[1,K−1],P¯ reaches the closest value to g
E
[1,K−1], and
gain gD
K,P¯
reaches the most similar value to gEK . As a common sense conclusion, for computing quantities
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ ) and max(g
D
K,P¯
), it suffices to calculate the values of the gains using the K different vectors
P¯ that have L = 1. Then, the minimum or maximum of these K calculated values should be taken, as
corresponds to each gain. This procedure entails an insignificant computational time. A final observation
can be made on figure 12 concerning the fact that some of the plotted visibilities are greater than 1. This is
so because, in order to provide a fair level comparison amongst the distinct values of L in the realistic cases,
we employed the ideal-case gains for L = 1 in (27) to (29), even for the nonideal cases where L > 1.
Multi-party quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 25ulti-party quantu fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 25
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of parties
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
E
x
p
e
ct
e
d
 v
a
lu
e
 o
f 
th
e
 v
is
ib
il
it
y
 v
[1
,K
–
1
]
(a) v
[1,K–1]
for =0.01
Our optimal circuit implementation
Our extendable circuit implementation
Generalized beamsplitter with Clements design
Generalized beamsplitter with Reck design
 
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of parties
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
E
x
p
e
ct
e
d
 v
a
lu
e
 o
f 
th
e
 v
is
ib
il
it
y
 v
[1
,K
–
1
]
(b) v
[1,K–1]
for =0.1
Our optimal circuit implementation
Our extendable circuit implementation
Generalized beamsplitter with Clements design
Generalized beamsplitter with Reck design
 
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of parties K
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
E
x
p
e
ct
e
d
 v
a
lu
e
 o
f 
th
e
 v
is
ib
il
it
y
 v
K
(c) v
K
for =0.01
Our optimal circuit implementation
Our extendable circuit implementation
Generalized beamsplitter with Clements design
Generalized beamsplitter with Reck design
 
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Number of parties K
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
E
x
p
e
ct
e
d
 v
a
lu
e
 o
f 
th
e
 v
is
ib
il
it
y
 v
K
(d) v
K
for =0.1
Our optimal circuit implementation
Our extendable circuit implementation
Generalized beamsplitter with Clements design
Generalized beamsplitter with Reck design
 
Fig. 11: Variation of the mean values of the visibility as a function of the number of parties K in four different referee
circuit implementations. Just one input state was taken with a phase different from the rest, i.e. L = 1. Losses
per beamsplitter (BS) were taken to be ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS. Different types of visibilities and fabrication noise
levels were considered: (a, b) visibility for detectors [1,K − 1] and (a) σ = 0.01, (b) σ = 0.1; (c, d) visibility
for detector K and (c) σ = 0.01, (d) σ = 0.1. The results were computed as the average of 500 realizations
using the model in subsection 3.3. The computed standard deviation (SD, not represented) is ∼ 10−3 for all the
visibility values corresponding to σ = 0.01, and ∼ 10−2 for σ = 0.1.
ig. 11: Variation of the ean values of the visibility as a function of the number of parties K in four different referee
circuit implementations. Just one input state was taken with a phase different from the rest, i.e. L = 1. Losses
per beamsplitter (BS) were taken to be ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS. Different types of visibilities and fabrication noise
levels were considered: (a, b) visibility for detectors [1,K − 1] and (a) σ = 0.01, (b) σ = 0.1; (c, d) visibility
for detector K and (c) σ = 0.01, (d) σ = 0.1. The results were computed as the average of 500 realizations
using the model in subsection 3.3. The computed standard deviation (SD, not represented) is ∼ 10−3 for all the
visibility values corresponding to σ = 0.01, and ∼ 10−2 for σ = 0.1.
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Fig. 12: Variation of the mean values of the visibility as a function of the number of parties K in the optimal circuit
implementation, for three different values of L. The value of L ≤ K
2
specifies the number of input states
whose phases are different from the rest K − L states. Losses per beamsplitter (BS) were taken to be
ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS. Different types of visibilities and fabrication noise levels were considered: (a, b) visibility
for detectors [1,K − 1] and (a) σ = 0.01, (b) σ = 0.1; (c, d) visibility for detector K and (c) σ = 0.01, (d)
σ = 0.1. These results clearly show that, under the considered fabrication parameters, the worst-case scenario
(smallest visibility) always corresponds to L = 1.
5. Comparative results
A plethora of plot results is presented and discussed in brief here. These results can be reproduced by applying
the methodology in the prior section endowed with the statistical outcomes, in the form of simulated photonic
gains, from the imperfection model in subsection 3.3. When computing the plot results here, we include
as sources of experimental errors: fabricative imperfections (phase shifter and transmittance mismatches),
beamsplitter insertion losses, channel losses, detector efficiencies, and the dark count rates present in the
detectors. The first two error sources mentioned above are modelled through the statistical imperfection
model. The rest of the sources are directly handled by the equations of the analytical methods for upper-
bounding the mean photon number. In a realistic scenario, however, additional sources of errors, such as
polarization and phase mismatches, can also be directly considered within the statistical model.
The Monte Carlo method underlying the imperfection model was applied averaging the results simulated
with 500 unitary matrices corresponding to our optimal design. This is the same number of stochastic
realizations used for the main results in [49, 50]. In our simulations, each unitary matrix is randomly
modified according to the statistical imperfection model. Given the relatively low order of magnitude of
the standard deviations compared to the absolute mean magnitudes at the logarithmic scale (see caption in
figure 11), they are not represented on the plots.
In the following, some common values used for the simulations presented in this section are discussed.
Except otherwise stated, the combined efficiency, which excludes beamsplitter losses, was set to η = 0.5.
This value might seem quite unrealistic; nevertheless, we note that all the results can be straightforwardly
scaled because of the fact that |α|2η = 12η |α|2η= 12 , where |α|
2
η is the result with an arbitrary η and |α|2η= 12
is the specific result used for our calculations. With regard to the foregoing, the main goal of plotting the
results is not to provide precise quantitative estimations, but rather to provide a qualitative overview of how
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the different involved variables affect the protocol performance and to prove that quantum supremacy is, in
principle, already experimentally achievable.
With regard to the dark count probabilities, we use the two discreet values pdark = 10
−9 and
pdark = 10
−11, except when analyzing the effects of a continuous distribution of pdark, in which case values
as high as pdark = 10
−7 were used in the computations. Again, these values, specially 10−11, may seem
difficult to achieve in practice with today’s technologies. It is this author’s belief, however, that in the near
future such devices will be commercially available at large scale. Actually, SNSPDs with pdark = 10
−11 were
already reported, for example, in [56, 57]. Just to put all these dark count rates in perspective, the dark
count probability for the QF experiment in [17] is about 4.4× 10−9.
For the ECC, we chose the same optimized random linear code (RLC) in [16], whose generator matrix
is a Toeplitz matrix. In particular, for this type of ECCs, the relationship between the rate c > 1 and the
minimum-distance parameter δ is determined as
c =
[
1 + δ · log2δ + (1− δ) · log2(1− δ)
]−1
. (30)
The particular ECC values selected for this work are δ = 0.78 and c = MN = 4.17.
In our plots, for the purpose of adequately confronting the represented QF communication cost, we
need on hand the expressions for the analogous cost of a classical protocol. The best classical fingerprinting
protocol known to date, valid for K = 2 only, is detailed in [26] and its communication cost can be expressed
in closed-form as
Cbest =
⌈
log(perror)
log
(
3
4
) ⌉× 2√N [bits/user]. (31)
We remark that there are other works [28,29], independent from [26], that lead to the result in (31) as well.
The protocols explained in [28,29], though, are not the same as the simple protocol in [26].
The best classical fingerprinting protocol known to date that is valid for any K ≥ 2 was recently reported
in [37]. It is based on a generalization of a 2-user protocol in [26]. This 2-user protocol, however, is not the
same as the protocol that gives the result in (31). In the generalization, each user sends 4 randomly chosen
blocks of size
⌈
3N
K
⌉
bits. For each pair of blocks from the users, the node applies a 4-time repeated version
of the so-called “2-user symmetric protocol” described in [26]. Additionally, in order to identify the blocks,
every user also sends labels comprising
⌈
log2(3N/
⌈
3N/K
⌉
)
⌉
bits. The resulting K-user communication
cost can be stated as
Cbest =

log(perror)
log
[
1− 19 (1− e−
1
2 )
]
×
8
√
2
⌈
3N
K
⌉
+ 4
log2
(
3N/
⌈
3N
K
⌉)
 [bits/user]. (32)
As a classical “no-go” result, there is a classical limit on the communication cost, below which it is
known that no classical protocol may operate, even protocols that could be unknown to date. For K = 2,
this limit was found in incomplete form (some multiplicative factors are missing) in [26, 27]. The complete
closed-form version was first provided in the supplementary material of [17]. A possible generalization to
K ≥ 2 users is derived in appendix C of the present work and it is given by
Climit =
(
1− 2√perror
)√
N
2
√
K ln 2
− 1
K
[bits/user]. (33)
Together with the cost of the best-known classical protocol, we shall also plot the limit in (33) for the sake
of completeness when comparing quantum communication costs. For our quantum upper bounds and for
the classical quantities in (31) to (33), we set the target error probability to a common value perror = 10
−5.
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5.1. Transmitted information comparison with previously published two-user referee strategy
As our first set of protocol simulation results, and serving the purpose of strengthening the correctness
verification of our analytical method in section 4, we particularize the referee strategy to the case K = 2
and then compare the results to those dispensed by other methods in previous publications. In this regard,
our referee decision strategy for the case with K − 1 detectors, when particularized to K = 2, is mostly the
same as in the paper by Xu et al [16]. The only difference lies in the referee threshold. In particular, for
a target error probability perror, Xu’s referee strategy uses a threshold r whose value satisfies the equalities
perror = Pr(D
E
1 > r) = Pr(D
D
1 ≤ r). In contrast, we recall that, in our strategy, we can only guarantee
perror ≥ Pr(DE1 > r),Pr(DD1 ≤ r). This less strict condition, in turn, allows for a compact mathematical
analysis extended to the multi-user case.
The specific method for ultimately calculating r is not explicitly detailed in [16]. To this regard, we
employed in our simulations the algorithm in section 2 of this paper. This algorithm assumes the same
conditions to calculate r as in [16], so it should always produce the same results as the method actually
used in this aforesaid reference, even if different. For comparison purposes, we simulated our two multi-user
strategies for the separate detector ensembles k ∈ [1,K − 1] and k = K. When particularized to K = 2, the
case k ∈ [1,K − 1] implies observing detector “1”, just as in Xu’s strategy according to our notation, and
the case k = K implies observing detector “2”.
Figure 13 shows the simulation results, where the transmitted information is represented as a function
of N at log-log scale. The fabrication noise level σ = 0.01 and the beamsplitter losses ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS
utilized here provide a visibility v = 0.98 for all the realistic protocols. The best-protocol classical information
was calculated with (31), and the classical limit corresponds to (33). The ideal QF protocol bound can be
either from (3) or from (17) and it assumes zero losses, zero imperfections and no dark counts.
In view of the results in figure 13, it is clear that Xu’s upper bound is tighter than those provided by
our two separate strategies. This behaviour occurs when our strategies are really ensuring an actual error
probability below the target perror, and the users need to send more information than required by perror. This
has to do with our more relaxed condition on the calculation of r. However, after the “elbow” of the curves,
where the slopes become more vertical, all the three plotted functions are basically undistinguishable. This
situation corresponds in our analytical method to a dominant term of M = cN and pdark, which occurs
when conditions (25) and (26) are satisfied. Another relevant comment on the results has to do with the
strong influence of pdark on the required transmitted information. In particular, a more favorable dark count
rate pushes the curve’s “elbow” towards a point where the input size N is larger. Finally, we perceive that,
in these particular simulations, all the QF protocol strategies beat the classical limit for most of the range
of N , while the best-known classical protocol is beaten nearly for all the represented range of N .Multi-party quantum fingerpr nting with weak coher t pulses 25 
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Fig. 13: Transmitted information comparison between a previously-published referee strategy that is valid for K = 2 only,
and our two multi-party referee strategies particularized for K = 2. The parameters for the two-user realistic
quantum fingerprinting protocols for all three strategies were perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding
beamsplitter (BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, σ = 0.01 (⇒ v = 0.98 for all the strategies, in this
particular scenario), (a) pdark = 10
−9, (b) pdark = 10−11.
5.2. Assessment of the impact of dark counts and visibility on the transmitted information
Fig. 13: Transmitted information c mparison between a previousl lished r f ree s rategy that is valid for K = 2 only,
and our two multi-party referee strategies particularized to 2. The parameters for the two-user realistic
quantum fingerprinting protocols for all three strategies were perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding
beamsplitter (BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, σ = 0.01 (⇒ v = 0.98 for all the strategies, in this
particular scenario), (a) pdark = 10
−9, (b) pdark = 10−11.
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5.2. Assessment of the impact of dark counts and visibility on the transmitted information
Focusing now only on protocol realizations with more than two users, we assess in this subsection 5.2 the
impact of the fabricative imperfections and the dark count rates on the amounts of transmitted information.
To this intent, we provide four plots in figure 14, resulting from taking K = 7, while the other four plots
in figure 15 were produced by taking K = 50. Each plot shows the evolution of the transmitted quantum
information for our two referee strategies, as a function of N = Mc at log-log scale. The amount of information
required by the best classical protocol for K ≥ 2 is also represented using (32), whereas the classical limit
comes from (33). The fabricative noise σ = 0.01 provides visibilities v[1,K−1] = 0.96 and vK = 0.93, and
σ = 0.1 provides v[1,K−1] = 0.87 and vK = 0.85. All these values correspond to K = 7. For the case K = 50,
the visibilities diminish as shown on the graphs in figure 15.
As a first evident assertion, observing the four plots of each figure and comparing the two figures to each
other, the effect of increasing imperfections (and hence reducing the visibility) has a very small impact on
the communication cost for the smallest number of users. It becomes much more noticeable for the largest
number of users, specially in the region of the curves before the “elbow”, where the term of M and pdark is
not the dominant one in (20a) and (23a). Additionally, this effect of increasing σ is more prominent when
the referee uses K − 1 detectors than when she uses just one.
As a second observation, in all the simulated cases, the strategy involving K − 1 detectors is clearly
superior than the other one before the “elbow”. However, as the term of M and pdark becomes dominant,
the strategy with just detector k = K provides the smallest communication cost. This is to be expected,
by comparing (20a) and (23a). These differences, between the two referee strategies in our work, are much
more noticeable as the number of users rises. Further, it can be also observed that the strategy with K − 1
detectors reaches the elbow point for a smallest raw message length N .
Also, we note that overcoming the classical limit is much more difficult than beating the best multi-party
classical protocol known to date. When attempting to beat the classical limit, dark counts are a key limiting
factor, much more dominant than σ. In particular, for our simulation with K = 50, we can only achieve less
information than the classical limit if we use pdark = 10
−11.
5.3. Relationship between transmitted information and transmitted energy
We study here the relationship between the transmitted information and the required energy. To this end,
figures 16 and 17 include the following four plots as functions of N , each for the same simulation case:
(a) information per user at log-log scale; (b) total mean photon number |α|2 at natural scale compared to
the amount of photonic bits required at the classical limit; (c) |α|2 at log-log scale compared to an ideal
quantum protocol; (d) amount K |α|
2
M at log-log scale. Figure 16 corresponds to K = 7, while figure 17
corresponds to K = 15. The photonic classical fingerprinting protocol refers to a classical protocol in which
a bit is assigned to a photon, hence the term “photonic bit,” as introduced in [15, 16]. The amount K |α|
2
M
is represented in order to confirm the strict validity of the assumption Kµin =
K|α|2
M  1 upon which the
mathematical results in (20) and (23) rely. All these simulations were carried out taking a reasonable dark
count rate pdark = 10
−9.
We observe in figures 16 and 17, for the region of non-dominant term of M and pdark before the “elbow”
in (a), that the total mean photon number |α|2 required per user remains constant in (b) and (c). This is
the same behaviour exhibited by the ideal protocol in (c), although the |α|2 level of this latter protocol is
much lower. After the “elbow”, the increment in |α|2 becomes exponential in the realistic protocols. This
happens because the combined effect of M and pdark becomes dominant and the users need to send more
energy to keep the error probabilities below the target value perror. When the term of M and pdark governs
the required value of |α|2, the clicks at the detectors become dominated by pdark and the gains in (19) and
(22) become close to each other.
Interestingly enough, there is a region in plots (b), of both figures under consideration, in which |α|2
remains practically constant for the QF protocol but the amount of energy of the photonic-bit classical
protocol grows exponentially, even at the classical limit. Thus, before the “elbow”, the QF protocol requires
an exponential reduction in terms of energy consumption, which is indeed remarkable. Finally, we also
observe in plots (d) that the premise Kµin =
K|α|2
M  1 is comfortably met. The greater the raw message
length N , the strongest the validity of the assumption on which our analytical model is constructed.
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Fig. 14: Variation of the transmitted information per user as a function of the raw message length N for K = 7 users.
For comparison purposes, we provide the classical lower bound and also the amount of bits per user required by
the best-known classical protocol valid for any K ≥ 2. The realistic multi-party quantum fingerprinting protocols
were analyzed for the following common parameters: perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding beamsplitter
(BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS. In order to appraise the influence of manufacturing imperfections
and dark count rates, the following four cases were computed: (a) σ = 0.01, pdark = 10
−9; (b) σ = 0.1,
pdark = 10
−9; (c) σ = 0.01, pdark = 10−11; (d) σ = 0.1, pdark = 10−11.
Fig. 14: Variation of the trans itted infor ation per user as a function of the raw message length N for K = 7 users.
For comparison purposes, we provide the classical lower bound and also the amount of bits per user required by
the best-known classical protocol valid for any K ≥ 2. The realistic multi-party quantum fingerprinting protocols
were analyzed for the following common parameters: perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding beamsplitter
(BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS. In order to appraise the influence of manufacturing imperfections
and dark count rates, the following four cases were computed: (a) σ = 0.01, pdark = 10
−9; (b) σ = 0.1,
pdark = 10
−9; (c) σ = 0.01, pdark = 10−11; (d) σ = 0.1, pdark = 10−11.
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Fig. 15: Variation of the transmitted information per user as a function of the raw message length N for K = 50 users.
For comparison purposes, we provide the classical lower bound and also the amount of bits per user required by
the best-known classical protocol valid for any K ≥ 2. The realistic multi-party quantum fingerprinting protocols
were analyzed for the following common parameters: perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding beamsplitter
(BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS. In order to evaluate the influence of manufacturing imperfections
and dark count rates, the following four cases were computed: (a) σ = 0.01, pdark = 10
−9; (b) σ = 0.1,
pdark = 10
−9; (c) σ = 0.01, pdark = 10−11; (d) σ = 0.1, pdark = 10−11.
Fig. 15: Variation of the trans itted infor ation per user as a function of the raw message length N for K = 50 users.
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Fig. 16: Influence of the raw message length N on the transmitted information and on the photon statistics for K = 7
users. The following parameters were chosen for the realistic multi-party quantum fingerprinting protocols:
perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding beamsplitter (BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, σ = 0.01,
pdark = 10
−9. (a) Comparison in terms of transmitted information, providing the classical limit and also the
amount of bits per user required by the best-known classical protocol. (b) Comparison of the total number of
photons transmitted per user that are needed in two quantum protocol referee strategies and in a hypothetical
classical limit protocol. (c) Comparison of the total number of photons per user required in two quantum protocol
referee strategies and in an ideal quantum protocol. (d) Expected total number of photons in K simultaneous
individual pulses arriving at the referee input ports at the same time, provided here to asses the validity of the
assumption Kµin =
K|α|2
M
≪ 1 in the analytical model for upper bounding |α|2.
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Fig. 17: Influence of the raw message length N on the transmitted information and on the photon statistics for K = 15
users. The following parameters were chosen for the realistic multi-party quantum fingerprinting protocols:
perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency excluding beamsplitter (BS) losses η = 0.5, ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, σ = 0.01,
pdark = 10
−9. (a) Comparison in terms of transmitted information, providing the classical limit and also the
amount of bits per user required by the best-known classical protocol. (b) Comparison of the total number of
photons transmitted per user that are needed in two quantum protocol referee strategies and in a hypothetical
classical limit protocol. (c) Comparison of the total number of photons per user required in two quantum protocol
referee strategies and in an ideal quantum protocol. (d) Expected total number of photons in K simultaneous
individual pulses arriving at the referee input ports at the same time, provided here to asses the validity of the
assumption Kµin =
K|α|2
M
≪ 1 in the analytical model for upper bounding |α|2.
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5.4. Quantum advantages in terms of transmitted information
Starting from this subsection, we focus exclusively on the strategy involving just one detector. This choice is
made because such strategy delivers the best performance in terms of energy consumption and transmitted
information when the raw input size N is arbitrarily large. To the purpose of intuitively represent on a 2D
plane, as a color plot, how the protocol behaves, we define the quantum advantages in terms of information
as Climit/Q and Cbest/Q. Here, Q is the quantum information defined in (6), Cbest is the number of bits per
user in the best-known K-user classical protocol given in (32), and Climit is the classical limit in (33).
Figure 18a exhibits a representation on a 2D plane of the maximum quantum advantages as a function
of K and pdark when σ = 0.01. The white dashed curve represents a lower bound below which quantum
supremacy may be achievable. The black dashed curve is analogous to the white one, but for an ideal circuit
with ηBS = 0 and σ = 0. Note that this ideal case is not the same as in previous figures, because here we
solely consider an ideal circuit and the detector dark counts are still on. These two dashed curves call again
attention to the fact that, with today’s technology, the dark counts are a much more limiting factor for the
QF protocol than the fabrication defects in the circuit. We can check in the graph of figure 18b how the
fabrication noise level degrades the visibility as the number of users is increased, from vK = 0.98, for K = 2,
down to a still relatively high value vK = 0.85 for K = 100.
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Fig. 18: (a) Maximum quantum advantages regarding transmitted information as a function of the number of parties K
and dark count rate. Two ratios are presented: between the classical limit information Climit and the quantum
informationQ, and between the best-known classical protocol information Cbest andQ. The following parameters
were used together with the optimal referee strategy: perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency η = 0.5 (Q may be
easily scaled for any η as Qη =
1
2η
Qη= 1
2
), ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, σ = 0.01. The white dashed curve indicates
a lower bound below which a positive quantum advantage is attainable. For comparison purposes, the black
dashed curve corresponds to an ideal referee circuit with ηBS = 0, σ = 0. (b) Visibility as a function of K
corresponding to the realistic optical circuit implementation used in (a).
5.5. Quantum advantages in terms of transmitted energy
Quantum advantages in terms of transmitted energy, analogous to those defined above for the information,
are analyzed here. Figure 19a shows that, indeed, quantum supremacy for energies is commonplace even
for ordinary photonic detectors. This reality represents huge energy savings of several orders of magnitude
when compared to any classical protocol implemented using photonic bits.
In the following, we deduce an approximate expression for calculating the maximum number of users K
for which quantum supremacy is achievable in terms of classical limit energy, as a function of µdark, perror,
c, δ and visibility vK . We assume that the condition in (26), for arbitrarily high M = cN , holds. Then, we
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rewrite |α|2 in (23a) as a function of visibility vK in (29) instead of as a function of the gains in (22):
∣∣∣αboundK ∣∣∣2 ' [2cNµdark · ln(1/perror)]1/22η (1− δ)(2vK − 1) . (34)
Now, assuming K  1, the version with photonic bits of the classical limit in (33) can be well approximated,
leaving out the term in 1/K, as
∣∣∣αclassicallimit ∣∣∣2 '
(
1− 2√perror
)√
N
2η
√
K ln 2
. (35)
Finally, equating these two previous expressions and solving for K, we arrive at
K ' (1− δ)
2
(2vK − 1)2(1− 2√perror)2
2µdarkc ln(2 + 1/perror)
. (36)
This latest equation takes into account the supposition that vK is independent from K. In practice, this
is not the case. However, we may fix an expected worst-case experimental value of the visibility and then
obtain a lower bound on the maximum number of users for which the quantum protocol requires less energy
than a hypothetical classical protocol matching the classical limit energy. Figure 19b shows an example
of the result in (36) at work. This result may be also of interest for determining the required dark count
probability as a function of the desired number of users K in an experimental realization.
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Fig. 19: (a) Quantum advantages concerning transmitted power, or energy, as a function of the number of parties K and
dark count rate. Two ratios are presented: between the classical limit protocol energy EC,limit and the quantum
protocol energy EQ, and between the best-known classical protocol energy EC,best and EQ. The following
parameters were used together with the optimal referee strategy: perror = 10
−5, combined efficiency η = 0.5
(the results here may be easily scaled for any value of η), ηBS = −0.2 dB/BS, σ = 0.01. (b) Lower bounds on
the maximum number of users that allows a positive quantum advantage in terms of energy as a function of the
dark count rate, for four assumed worst-case visibility values.
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6. Conclusions and future perspectives
In this paper, we have proposed and investigated a K-user QF protocol based on coherent states. One of the
main incentives is on the fact that an analogous classical protocol is known and can be used for comparison
purposes to attest quantum supremacy. Our work constitutes a step towards a deeper understanding of
quantum networks embracing a central processing node.
As one of the main contributions of this work, we have provided innovative optical circuit designs
required for the protocol, and have discussed the benefits and issues of each design. Then, we have proposed
and detailed two separate referee strategies for the central node. Also, we have introduced a fully-analytical
method to perform the estimations of the amounts of qubits and energy required for each user. These
analytical expressions are, indeed, very convenient to understand how the different involved quantities affect
the protocol execution, even at the experimental level. Further, simulations are presented that certify
quantum supremacy under certain circumstances. This advantage of the quantum protocol over the classical
one is especially noticeable when comparing energy consumptions, which paves the way for the deployment
of quantum networks implementing data-processing “green” protocols. In doing the simulations, we also
determined under which conditions one of the proposed strategies is more efficient than the other.
An instinctive approach to continue our research would exploit the fact that the protocol sends pulses
with very low amplitude, mostly empty coherent states. This means that the expected time between clicks
at each individual detector is large, and detector dead times are usually not a problem. Besides this benefit,
the referee node can be adjusted to process many signals in parallel. This idea was first proposed in [58] for
the two-user protocol and, very recently, it was experimentally demonstrated with improvements in [59].
Another natural step for the continuation of this work would investigate different ways of defining the
trains of pulses sent by the users. In the present work, we stuck to the same scaling properties and to
the same number of pulses per user as in the standard two-user protocol. Perhaps, some improvements in
the communication cost can be attained by redefining the coherent states in such a way that exploits more
efficiently the peculiarities of the multi-party scenario.
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Appendix A. List of symbols
The table below contains detailed descriptions of the foremost notation symbols used in the present
manuscript.
Table A1: List of symbols used in the manuscript.
Symbol Description
N Raw message length: number of bits in the raw binary strings that each user receives (or
already has in his/her custody) in order to fingerprint, per user.
M Transmitted sequence length: number of optical pulses sent by each user in a coherent-state
quantum protocol in the sequence
⊗M
m=1
∣∣∣± α√
M
〉
m
; binary length of the fingerprints in a
classical protocol.
Multi-party quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses 37
Table A1: List of symbols used in the manuscript.
Symbol Description
m Integer label 1 ≤ m ≤ M assigned to each coherent state or to each mode in the transmitted
sequence of coherent states or modes.
c = MN > 1 Rate of the ECC (error correcting code) used for amplifying differences between different raw
message binary strings in a quantum protocol.
δ ECC (error correcting code) parameter: maximum fraction of bits in which two codewords
have the same bit values. The minimum distance of the ECC is (1− δ)M .
Q Amount of transmitted information measured in qubits/user that is required in a quantum
fingerprinting protocol.
C Amount of transmitted information measured in bits/user that is required in a classical
fingerprinting protocol.
EQ Transmitted energy that is required for each user in a quantum fingerprinting protocol.
EC Transmitted energy that is required for each user in a classical fingerprinting protocol
implemented with photonic bits.
K Total number of users.
k Integer label 1 ≤ k ≤ K assigned to each user, and also label allocated to each referee input
port and output port.
|α|2 Mean photon number of all the pulses in the transmitted sequence ⊗Mm=1 ∣∣∣± α√M 〉m that each
user sends towards the referee, in a quantum fingerprinting protocol.
µin =
|α|2
M Mean photon number of each individual input pulse (coherent state
∣∣∣ ±α√
M
〉
, without including
any losses in this notation) at the referee.
t Power transmittance of each unbalanced beamsplitter (BS) in the referee optical circuit. The
corresponding power reflectance of the BS is r = 1− t.
τ Amplitude transmittance of a symmetric 50:50 beamsplitter (BS). Ideally, τ = 2−1/2.
σT Fabrication noise level affecting transmittance τ of each of the 50:50 beamsplitters (BS). These
50:50 BS are used for implementing all the unbalanced beamsplitters present in the referee
circuit. σT is modelled as the standard deviation of a zero-mean normal random variable
affecting τ as τ = 2−1/2(1 + σT · randn).
σP Fabrication noise level affecting phase shifters inside the referee circuit. If φideal represents an
ideal phase, then σP models a phase deviation as φrealistic = φideal + σP · randn.
σ General fabrication noise level of the referee circuit. Present-day technology allows achieving
minimum values σT = σP = 0.01. Accordingly, for simplicity, we always consider that both
tolerances have the same value, and we simply define σ = σT = σP.
µEk Mean photon number at referee circuit output port k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K, when all the individual
input states (one state from each user) have the same phase.
µD
k,P¯
Mean photon number at referee circuit output k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K, when L (1 ≤ L ≤ K2 ) input
phases are different from the rest K−L phases. It depends on P¯ , which is a vector with phase
labels. For example, in a protocol with K = 4 users:
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
⇒ P¯ =
(1,−1,−1, 1), L = 2.
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Table A1: List of symbols used in the manuscript.
Symbol Description
P¯ See previous definition.
L Integer number 1 ≤ L ≤ K2 that indicates the number of phase labels in P¯ that are different
from the rest K−L labels. Restriction L ≤ K2 is introduced because, as an example, individual
input states at the referee {
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
} and {
∣∣∣ −α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
,
∣∣∣ α√
M
〉
}
both produce identical photon statistics at the referee output ports.
pEclick,k,
pD
click,k,P¯
Click probabilities at output detector k (1 ≤ k ≤ K), when all the individual input
states (one state from each user) at the referee are equal (E) to each other, or when
some of them are different (D). The maximum theoretical value that pE,Dclick can take ∀k is
pE,Dclick = 1 − exp
(
−K|α|2M
)
' K|α|2M . This approximation holds if Kµin = K|α|
2
M  1. As a
consequence, if K|α|2/M  1, then it is always true that pEclick,k = 1 − exp
(−µEk ) ' µEk and
pD
click,k,P¯
= 1− exp
(
−µD
k,P¯
)
' µD
k,P¯
.
DEk , D
D
k Number of clicks at output detector with label k when all the K sequences of users’ transmitted
states are equal (E) to each other, or at least one of them is different (D) from the rest. These
numbers of clicks correspond to complete sequences of coherent states
⊗M
m=1
∣∣∣± α√
M
〉
m
, not
to K individual input states
∣∣∣ ±α√
M
〉
.
Dk Number of clicks observed by the referee at detector k, without any knowledge about whether
all the users’ state sequences are equal to each other, or whether some of them are different.
r Referee threshold in a quantum protocol. In one strategy, the referee concludes that all the K
sequences of transmitted states are equal to each other if
∑K−1
k=1 Dk ≤ r. In another strategy,
the referee concludes that they are different if Dk=K ≤ r. The calculation of r depends on the
particular strategy. Without loss of generality, we have assumed here that label k = K always
corresponds to the only detector that losses photons, compared to the all-equal inputs, when
at least one of the input states at the referee circuit multiport differs from the rest.
perror Target upper bound on the desired error probability in any fingerprinting protocol, either
classical or quantum.
µdark, pdark Dark count rate of the photon detectors.
gE[1,K−1],
gD
[1,K−1],P¯ ,
gEK , g
D
K,P¯
Gains at the referee optical circuit, defined as gE[1,K−1] =
1
µin
∑K−1
k=1 µ
E
k , g
D
[1,K−1],P¯ =
1
µin
∑K−1
k=1 µ
D
k,P¯
, gEK =
µEK
µin
, gD
K,P¯
=
µD
K,P¯
µin
. All these gains g are theoretically bounded as
0 ≤ g ≤ K. In a real experimental setup, these gains may be measured in the classical optical
regime, before starting the quantum protocol.
v[1,K−1],
vK
Visibilities (figure of merit for referee circuits) defined as
v[1,K−1] = 12
(
1 +
K
[
gD
[1,K−1],P¯∗−gE[1,K−1]
]
4(K−1)
)
, vK =
1
2
(
1 +
K
[
gEK−gDK,P¯∗
]
4(K−1)
)
.
P¯ ∗ above is a worst-case vector P¯ that minimizes visibility values. In practice, the minimization
may be carried out by calculating (brute force, low computational cost) or measuring (if real
experiment) for all K vectors P¯ that have L = 1, and then taking the smallest visibility.
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Table A1: List of symbols used in the manuscript.
Symbol Description
η Combined efficiency that includes losses of the quantum channel and detector efficiencies. It
does not include beamsplitter (BS) losses, as these BS losses affect differently each path from
any circuit input to any circuit output. The effect of beamsplitter losses is fully included (either
by simulation or by measurement) in gains gE[1,K−1], g
D
[1,K−1],P¯ , g
E
K , g
D
K,P¯
and in visibilities
v[1,K−1], vK .
ηBS Losses of each of the 50:50 beamsplitters that are used for implementing all the unbalanced
beamsplitters in the referee circuit. The effect of these losses ηBS is fully included (either by
simulation or by measurement) in all the gains and in the visibilities defined above.
XEk Random variables with Bernoulli distribution for each output k, with 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Variables
XEk model the click or no click at output detector k when K input states equal (E) to each
other arrive at the referee.
XDk Analogous to the previous definition, but pertaining to the situation when at least one input
state is different (D) from the rest.
Appendix B. Upper bounds on the total mean photon number per user
This appendix, mostly self-contained in nature, covers the detailed mathematical steps required to obtain
closed-form analytical upper bounds on the total mean photon number |α|2, per user, required for a successful
implementation of a multi-party quantum fingerprinting protocol. Two different upper bounds are derived
in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2 that are applicable to separate referee strategies (decision rules). We
assume a realistic optical circuit at the referee involving imperfections of any kinds. In our circuit model, the
combined effect of such general imperfections is fully included in certain gains that establish relationships
between the mean photon number at any circuit input and the mean photon number of certain sets of
outputs.
In order to accomplish the aforesaid goal of upper-bounding |α|2, we employ a particular version of
the Chernoff bounds [60] as described in detail in [61, 62]. We first describe Chernoff bounds as applied
to generic random variables. Afterwards, we define the concise random variables that are required in our
physical model.
Theorem B.1 (Chernoff Bounds) Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi be a random variable obtained as the sum of
Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, independent Bernoulli random variables. Let µ = E(X) be the mean, or expected value,
of X. Then
(i) Upper tail: Pr[X ≥ (1 + λupper)µ] ≤ exp
(
− λ
2
upper
2+λupper
µ
)
∀λupper > 0;
(ii) Lower tail: Pr[X ≤ (1− λlower)µ] ≤ exp
(
−λ2lower2 µ
)
∀ 0 < λlower < 1.
In our particular application, we shall need to use an identical threshold value r for the two tails stated
in Theorem B.1 above, in order to calculate both the upper tail as Pr[X ≥ r] and the lower tail as Pr[X ≤ r].
Furthermore, we shall apply each tail to a different random variable; hence we write below Xupper and Xlower,
using the subscript labels to emphasize the fact that both still-generic random variables X are different. To
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sum up, we may rewrite Theorem B.1 in a more convenient and clear way for our specific purposes, as follows:
r = (1 + λupper)µupper
r = (1− λlower)µlower
}
⇒

Pr[Xupper ≥ r] ≤ exp
(
− (r − µupper)
2
r + µupper
)
∀r > µupper;
Pr[Xlower ≤ r] ≤ exp
(
− (r − µlower)
2
2µlower
)
∀ 0 < r < µlower.
(B.1)
Hereinafter, we describe in brief the circuit at the referee node and define the physical random variables
that are required to judiciously apply the above-explained Chernoff bounds. The referee’s circuit comprises
K optical input ports and K optical output ports, with K being also the total number of parties involved in
the protocol. An integer label k with 1 ≤ k ≤ K is assigned to each input and output port. Without any loss
of generality, we assume in this appendix that the last label k = K always corresponds to the only output
that losses photons when not all K input states
∣∣±√µin〉 have the same phase (see section 3 for a detailed
description of the referee’s circuit). Now, let XEk , with 1 ≤ k ≤ K, be a random variable with Bernoulli
distribution for the number of clicks (0 or 1 click) at output detector k when K coherent states with identical
phases arrive at the referee at the same time from K users. Similarly, XDk is an analogous random variable
for the case when some of the K input states are different, i.e. have phases that differ from the rest. The
K different random variables XEk are independent from each other, for any fixed coherent states that are
inputted to the referee at the same arrival time, because the average photon number at each output is also
fixed. The same argument is also applicable to the other set of variables XDk .
Random variables XDk depend on a vector P¯ that contains the phases of K simultaneous input pulses∣∣±√µin〉, as detailed in Appendix A. This dependency is not explicitly included in the notation of XDk just
for the sake of simplicity. We additionally introduce an integer L to specify the number of phases in P¯ that
are different from the rest K − L phases. Throughout the mathematical development in this appendix, we
do not anticipate an analytical worst-case value for L. However, numerical evaluation for determining the
worst-case L on the grounds of analytical visibility models is carried out in subsection 4.2. The results there
clearly show that, considering present-day technology parameters in any realistic referee circuit design, the
worst-case scenario consistently corresponds to L = 1. As a consequence, we may assert that it suffices
to take into account in our upper-bound analysis the K instances of vector P¯ that contain just one phase
difference.
Let us remark the fact that variables XDk are used for modelling the effect of differences in K individual
pulses arriving at the same time at the referee, that is,
⊗K
k=1
∣∣±√µin〉k. As this set XDk is not enough for our
purposes, an additional ensemble of random variables X˜Dk,m needs to be introduced. These latter variables
are for modelling the effect of differences in the K complete sequences of M pulses
⊗M
m=1
∣∣±√µin〉m sent by
the users, and not just in K individual simultaneous input pulses entering the circuit:
X˜Dk,m =
{
XDk for any (1− δ) ·M indices m,
XEk for any δ ·M indices m.
(B.2)
Parameter δ in the definitions above represents the “distance parameter” of the error correcting code (ECC).
The ECC is used in the quantum protocol for amplifying differences in the transmitted coherent-pulse
sequences. δ is the maximum fraction of bits in which two ECC codewords have the same bit values. The
minimum distance of the ECC can be simply expressed as (1 − δ)M . Equation (B.2) corresponds to any
worst-case scenarios in which the number of instances of K simultaneous dissimilar states arriving at the
referee is the same as the minimum ECC distance. In other words, this worst-case different-input scenario
intuitively corresponds to the case where the differing sequences are the most similar to all equal sequences.
Thus, this described situation is the most difficult to distinguish by the referee.
Before fully entering into mathematical elaboration, we present in detail the two separate referee
strategies that we consider in the analytical developments in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2. In order
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to simplify the explanation of such strategies, it is convenient to first define some final notation. We denote
as DEk =
∑M
m=1X
E
k the total number of clicks at any output detector k when the K complete sequences of
M coherent states are equal to each other. In the same way, DDk =
∑M
m=1 X˜
D
k,m represents the amount of
clicks at detector k when at least one of the input sequences differs from the rest. We simply denote as Dk
the total number of clicks in a real scenario where the referee has no previous knowledge of whether the input
sequences are different or are the same. The referee utilizes a certain threshold value r that she compares
to certain values of Dk in order to conclude if the input sequences are different or not. In the remainder
part of the appendix, we provide analytical methods for computing both r and the sought upper bounds for
|α|2. In particular, according to the general operation of the circuit described in section 3, the referee may
implement two different decision rules depending on the detectors that she observes, as we summarize next:
Strategy observing K − 1 detectors with labels 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1:
• Referee infers equal input sequences if ∑K−1k=1 Dk ≤ r.
• Referee infers different input sequences if ∑K−1k=1 Dk > r.
– Error happens when the input sequences are different and the referee announces “equal,” if∑K−1
k=1 D
D
k =
∑K−1
k=1
∑M
m=1 X˜
D
k,m ≤ r.
– Error happens when the input sequences are equal and the referee announces “different,” if∑K−1
k=1 D
E
k =
∑K−1
k=1
∑M
m=1X
E
k > r.
Strategy observing 1 detector with label k = K:
• Referee infers different input sequences if DK ≤ r.
• Referee infers equal input sequences if DK > r.
– Error happens when the input sequences are equal and the referee announces “different,” if
DEK =
∑M
m=1X
E
K ≤ r.
– Error happens when the input sequences are different and the referee announces “equal,” if
DDK =
∑M
m=1 X˜
D
K,m > r.
Appendix B.1. Referee strategy observing the detectors that gain photons in the case of different individual
input states
In this subsection, we assume that the referee counts clicks in those output detectors with labels 1 ≤ k ≤ K−1
and she does not observe detector k = K. We use notation pEerror for the probability of error that occurs
when the input sequences are all the same but the referee wrongly announces they are different. Likewise,
pDerror corresponds to an error that happens when at least one of the input sequences is different but the
referee incorrectly concludes they are equal.
Applying the upper tail inequality in (B.1) to the first K−1 random variables XEk , previously described
in the introduction of the present appendix, we may upper bound error probability pEerror as follows, with
notation E(·) designating statistical mean values:
pEerror = Pr
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
XEk > r
 ≤ exp
−
(
r −
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk )
)2
r +
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk )
 valid if r >
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk ). (B.3)
Using now the first K − 1 random variables X˜Dk,m in index k, which are described in (B.2), on the lower tail
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inequality in (B.1), the upper bound on error probability pDerror satisfies
pDerror = Pr
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
X˜Dk,m ≤ r
 ≤ exp
−
(
r −
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)
)2
2
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)
 valid if 0 < r <
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m).
(B.4)
We must opt now for defining a particular referee threshold value r as a function of the mean values
of XEk and X˜
D
k,m. The following definition was chosen because it provides a very easy comparison between
the separate error upper bounds in (B.3) and (B.4). This comparison allows us to pick out the worst-case
bound. Additionally, the chosen definition for r provides a closed-form threshold expression as a function of
relevant parameters of the quantum protocol, as it will become clear later:
r =
1
2
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
[
E(XEk ) + E(X˜
D
k,m)
]
. (B.5)
We rewrite (B.3) and (B.4) using the definition for r in (B.5):
pEerror ≤ exp
−
(
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)−
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk )
)2
2
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m) + 6
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk )
 , (B.6)
pDerror ≤ exp
−
(
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)−
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk )
)2
8
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)
 . (B.7)
By combining validity conditions shown in (B.3) and (B.4), it is clear that our ongoing mathematical
elaboration based on Chernoff bounds can only be used if
∑K−1
k=1
∑M
m=1 E(X
E
k ) <
∑K−1
k=1
∑M
m=1 E(X˜
D
k,m). The
meaning of this inequality in the physical world establishes that K−1 circuit outputs must gain photons when
we switch from equal input states to different input states. This is the desired behaviour of the circuit under
normal realistic circumstances. Moreover, the aforesaid inequality enables an easy comparison between the
denominators inside the exponentials in (B.6) and (B.7). The worst-case bound clearly corresponds always to
pDerror in (B.7), as it provides the greatest upper bound for the error probability. Consequently, the remainder
of this Appendix B.1 is aimed at obtaining an upper bound for |α|2 based on (B.7), and we dismiss (B.6).
Henceforth, we assume that condition Kµin =
K|α|2
M  1 holds, where µin is the photon number of
each individual input pulse. This approximation is always correct if K  M , which corresponds to the
cases of interest addressed in this manuscript, and was checked to be valid for all the realistic scenarios
analyzed in Section 5. Under the considered assumption, we can approximate click probabilities at output
detectors as pEclick,k ' µEk , pDclick,k,P¯ ' µDk,P¯ . A subscript P¯ is used to emphasize the fact that the photon
number at each output k depends on vector P¯ that contains the information of the K input pulse phases.
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For simplicity, detector efficiencies and dark count rates are not yet specified in the definitions of the click
probabilities; below, we introduce a combined efficiency quantity that includes detector efficiencies as well
as channel losses.
By defining now the gains of the first K − 1 circuit outputs as
gE[1,K−1] =
K−1∑
k=1
µEk
µin
, gD[1,K−1],P¯ =
K−1∑
k=1
µD
k,P¯
µin
, (B.8)
we can easily express the expected quantities concerning amounts of clicks in (B.7) as
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk ) 'M ·
K−1∑
k=1
µEk + (K − 1)Mµdark = gE[1,K−1]|α|2 + (K − 1)Mµdark, (B.9)
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m) '
δ · K−1∑
k=1
µEk + (1− δ) ·
K−1∑
k=1
µDk,P¯
M + (K − 1)Mµdark =
= δ · gE[1,K−1]|α|2 + (1− δ) · gD[1,K−1],P¯ |α|2 + (K − 1)Mµdark.
(B.10)
By using again the validity conditions in (B.3) and (B.4), this time on the two preceding equations, we
can obtain an interesting condition that both gains must satisfy:
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk ) <
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m) ⇒ gE[1,K−1] < gD[1,K−1],P¯ . (B.11)
We express now the probability bound in (B.7) as a function of the gains in (B.8) and of other protocol
parameters, by replacing with the expected values in (B.9) and (B.10):
perror ≤ exp
−
(
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)−
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(XEk )
)2
8
K−1∑
k=1
M∑
m=1
E(X˜Dk,m)
 =
= exp
−1
8
·
(1− δ)2(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ − gE[1,K−1])
2|α|4[
δ · gE[1,K−1] + (1− δ) · gD[1,K−1],P¯
]
|α|2 + (K − 1)Mµdark
 .
(B.12)
Gain gE[1,K−1] in (B.12) is theoretically a constant magnitude, since we assume that all the input pulses
have the same or approximately the same amplitude. Conversely, gain gD
[1,K−1],P¯ depends on the particular
phases of the K input states. In order to infer a worst-case value for gain gD
[1,K−1],P¯ , we next perform an
optimization assuming that gD
[1,K−1],P¯ is a continuous variable denoted as g
D. This is just a “mathematical
license” taken to analyze the behaviour of the varying gain. A function f(gD) is introduced in the phase
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argument of (B.12) as perror ≤ exp
(− 18f(gD)):
f(gD) =
(1− δ)2(gD − gE)2|α|4[
δ · gE + (1− δ) · gD] |α|2 + (K − 1)Mµdark . (B.13)
By equating the derivative to zero,
∂f(gD)
∂gD = 0, it is easy to find two critical points. One of these points is
gD1 = g
E and the other critical point gD2 verifies
gD2 − gE =
−2
[
gE|α|2 + (K − 1)Mµdark
]
(1− δ)|α|2 < 0. (B.14)
This inequality in (B.14) clearly poses a contradiction on condition (B.11) and, as a result, only critical
point gD1 = g
E stands in our analysis. Moreover, it is easy to prove that function f(gD) decreases as gD
shrinks closer to the other gain gE. As a consequence of this analysis, the worst-case value of gD
[1,K−1],P¯ that
minimizes function (B.13) and maximizes error probability bound (B.12) corresponds to the minimum value
of gD
[1,K−1],P¯ . Finally, solving for |α|
2
in (B.12) and including the combined efficiency η, we get
∣∣∣αbound[1,K−1]∣∣∣2 = 4q + 2
[
4q2 + 2(1− δ)2
(
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
)2
(K − 1)Mµdark · ln(1/perror)
]1/2
η (1− δ)2
(
min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ )− gE[1,K−1]
)2 ,
(B.15)
with
q =
[
δ · gE[1,K−1] + (1− δ) ·min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ )
]
· ln(1/perror). (B.16)
Combined efficiency η takes into account detector efficiencies and channel losses. Detector efficiencies are
assumed to be the same for all detectors. In practice, this may be a rather good realistic approximation;
nevertheless, different quantum efficiencies may also be easily considered just by transferring their effects
from η to the gains gE[1,K−1] and g
D
[1,K−1],P¯ .
A closed-form expression for the referee threshold is obtained by taking (B.9) and (B.10) into (B.5) and
by including the minimum value of gD
[1,K−1],P¯ (the value that maximizes error probability, as proven above):
r =
1
2
|α|2
[
(1 + δ) · gE[1,K−1] + (1− δ) ·min(gD[1,K−1],P¯ )
]
+ (K − 1)Mµdark. (B.17)
We remark again the fact that quantum fingerprinting with this particular strategy of observing K − 1
detectors is only possible if min(gD
[1,K−1],P¯ ) > g
E
[1,K−1].
Appendix B.2. Referee strategy observing the detector that losses photons in the case of different individual
input states
In this second subsection, we address the referee decision rule consisting of counting clicks in just the last
detector. By convention, this last detector has a label k = K assigned. The notation employed throughout
the present mathematical elaboration is identical to that in Appendix B.1.
We apply the upper tail case in (B.1) to random variable X˜DK,m (note the subscript k = K corresponding
to the last variable in the ensemble X˜Dk,m, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, defined in (B.2)) in order to upper bound error
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probability pDerror, corresponding to the case of at least one input sequence differing from the rest:
pDerror = Pr
 M∑
m=1
X˜DK,m > r
 ≤ exp
−
(
r −
M∑
m=1
E(X˜DK,m)
)2
r +
M∑
m=1
E(X˜DK,m)
 valid if r >
M∑
m=1
E(X˜DK,m). (B.18)
Using now random variable XEK on the lower tail inequality of Chernoff bounds in (B.1), we get an upper
bound for error probability pEerror that corresponds to the case of all equal K input sequences of coherent
states:
pEerror = Pr
 M∑
m=1
XEK ≤ r
 ≤ exp
−
(
r −
M∑
m=1
E(XEK)
)2
2
M∑
m=1
E(XEK)
 valid if 0 < r <
M∑
m=1
E(XEK). (B.19)
Using the same definition for the referee threshold r in (B.5), we may rewrite the two preceding
inequalities (B.18) and (B.19) in a more convenient way for our purposes:
pDerror ≤ exp
−
(
M∑
m=1
[
E(XEK)− E(X˜DK,m)
])2
M∑
m=1
[
2 · E(XEK) + 6 · E(X˜DK,m)
]
 , (B.20)
pEerror ≤ exp
−
(
M∑
m=1
[
E(XEK)− E(X˜DK,m)
])2
8
M∑
m=1
E(XEK)
 . (B.21)
Combining both correctness conditions of Chernoff bounds in (B.18) and (B.19), we know that∑M
m=1 E(X˜
D
K,m) <
∑M
m=1 E(X
E
K). This inequality has a clear meaning in the physical world: the last
circuit output must lose photons when switching from equal input states to different input states. This is
the desired circuit behaviour under normal realistic circumstances. Additionally, the aforesaid inequality
allows an easy comparison between the denominators inside the exponential functions in (B.20) and (B.21).
Clearly, inequality (B.21) imposes on the error probability an upper bound that is always greater than (B.20).
As a consequence, for the rest of the present mathematical development, we shall focus on (B.21) only.
Following identical arguments as for deducing equations (B.9) and (B.10) for the other referee strategy,
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we can calculate now the expected amounts of clicks that appear in (B.21):
M∑
m=1
E(X˜DK,m) 'M ·
[
δ · µEK + (1− δ) · µDK,P¯
]
+Mµdark =
= δ · gEK |α|2 + (1− δ) · gDK,P¯ |α|2 +Mµdark,
(B.22)
M∑
m=1
E(XEK) 'M · µEK +Mµdark = gEK |α|2 +Mµdark, (B.23)
where now, for the particular referee strategy considered in this elaboration, gains are defined as
gEK =
µEK
µin
, gDK,P¯ =
µD
K,P¯
µin
. (B.24)
By using again the conditions in (B.18) and (B.19) on (B.22) and (B.23), we obtain the following
condition pertaining to the circuit gains:
M∑
m=1
E(X˜DK,m) <
M∑
m=1
E(XEK) ⇒ gDK,P¯ < gEK . (B.25)
We may finally express the probability bound in (B.21) as a function of the gains and other relevant
protocol parameters as
perror ≤ exp
−
(
M∑
m=1
[
E(XEK)− E(X˜DK,m)
])2
8
M∑
m=1
E(XEK)
 = exp
−1
8
·
(1− δ)2(gEK − gDK,P¯ )
2|α|4
gEK |α|2 +Mµdark
 . (B.26)
Including combined efficiency η and realizing that the worst-case error upper bound occurs when vector
P¯ produces the maximum value of gD
K,P¯
(keep in mind that gain inequality in (B.25) must hold), we may
solve (B.26) in order to upper bounding |α|2 as satisfying
∣∣∣αboundK ∣∣∣2 = 4q + 2
[
4q2 + 2(1− δ)2
(
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
)2
Mµdark · ln(1/perror)
]1/2
η (1− δ)2
(
gEK −max(gDK,P¯ )
)2 , (B.27)
with
q = gEK · ln(1/perror). (B.28)
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A closed-form equation for referee threshold r may also be obtained from (B.22) and (B.23) by incorporating
the maximum value of gD
K,P¯
:
r =
1
2
|α|2
[
(1 + δ) · gEK + (1− δ) ·max(gDK,P¯ )
]
+Mµdark. (B.29)
Let us finally emphasize again that quantum fingerprinting with this strategy of observing just one
detector is only realizable if gEK > max(g
D
K,P¯
).
Appendix C. Transmitted information in the multi-party classical limit
An analytical lower bound on the amount of transmitted bits required in a classical K-user fingerprinting
protocol is deduced in this appendix. We employ a simplified version of Claim 2.4 presented both in [26]
and in the supplementary material of [17]. Though simplified, the 2-user claim upon which our K-user
elaboration leverages is totally equivalent to those presented in [17,26] for the 2-user scenario. Supplementary
material of [17] blends the proof of the claim with the final result itself, including additional notation that
is not required to understand the final result. Meanwhile, the equivalent result in [26] focuses on finding
the scaling (information complexity cost) of fingerprinting, rather than finding a tight lower bound on the
transmitted information.
Claim C.1. (From Claim 2.4 in [17, 26]) Let x (y) be a bit string owned by Alice (Bob) containing NA
(NB) bits. During the classical protocol, Alice (Bob) sends to the referee another bit string F (x) (F (y))
containing MA (MB) bits. The referee’s task consists of computing any boolean function f(x, y) = {0, 1}
using not the original bit strings x and y but instead the two strings F (x) and F (y) comprising MA and MB
bits, respectively, that she receives from Alice and Bob. This complete protocol involving Alice, Bob and the
referee is assumed to be a so-called private-coin3 two-sided4 error randomized protocol. We remark the fact
that the herein presented classical protocol is not only specific for classical fingerprinting, but it may also
be used for any boolean function f(x, y) = {0, 1} whatever it is. The claim states that, if the probability
of error when the referee computes f(x, y) is upper bounded by perror, then the following inequalities must
simultaneously hold on the amounts of bits:
NA ≤MA
8 ln(2)
(
1 +MB
)(
1− 2√perror
)2
 , (C.1a)
NB ≤MB
8 ln(2)
(
1 +MA
)(
1− 2√perror
)2
 . (C.1b)
The approach we suggest for the multi-party scenario merely consists in thinking of a K-party classical
protocol as a 2-party protocol, in which Alice plays the role of a certain amount of original users and Bob
plays the role of the remaining users. As it will become clear following the complete development in this
appendix, the specific approach that minimizes the amount of transmitted bits requires that Alice (or Bob)
represents K2 parties if K is even or
K−1
2 parties if K is odd. Let us assume that the number of parties K is
odd. Under this initial assumption, each party represented by Alice sends MAk bits, with k = 1, . . . ,
K−1
2 , so
3 “Private-coin” means that both Alice and Bob are restricted to local unshared randomness only. They are allowed to share
randomness neither with each other nor with the referee.
4 “Two-sided error” means that, when announcing the function outcome, the referee makes mistakes with probability perror at
most, and this probability is independent from the actual value of f(x, y), which can be either 0 or 1. In contrast, a classical
protocol in which the referee makes no mistakes for one of the two possible boolean values of f(x, y) is called “one-sided”
protocol.
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that Alice sends
∑K−1
2
k=1 M
A
k bits in total. Similarly, each of Bob’s parties sends M
B
k bits, with k = 1, . . . ,
K+1
2 ,
for a total of
∑K+1
2
k=1 M
B
k bits sent by Bob.
Let us note that the assumptions by virtue of which groups of original parties are represented by Alice
and Bob may, in principle, pose a certain violation of local randomness, the quantification of which is beyond
our aims. This observation does not invalidate, by any means, the final results here. This is so because we
are finding a lower bound for the private-coin K-user protocol, and the assumption that certain pairs of users
could have access to shared randomness would signify that they are actually transmitting less information
than the required amount. As the only consequence, our lower bound would not be as tight as with a pure
private-coin model. In fact, the same approach was used, in another context, for the classical protocol in the
proof of Lemma 3.2 of [37]: The K-player protocol induces a two-player protocol.
Without loss of generality, let us suppose now that the average number of the bits sent by Bob’s parties
is greater than or equal to the average number of bits sent by the players represented by Alice, i.e.
M¯B ≥ M¯A, M¯A = 2
K − 1
K−1
2∑
k=1
MAk , M¯
B =
2
K + 1
K+1
2∑
k=1
MBk . (C.2)
Applying (C.1a) and (C.1b) to Alice’s and Bob’s parties, assuming that each of the K players owns exactly
N bits, we get


K − 1
2
N ≤


K − 1
2
M¯A
4 ln(2)
[
2 + (K + 1)M¯B
](
1− 2√perror
)2
 ≤K − 12 M¯B
4 ln(2)
[
2 + (K + 1)M¯B
](
1− 2√perror
)2
 , (C.3)


K + 1
2
N ≤


K + 1
2
M¯B
4 ln(2)
[
2 + (K − 1)M¯A](
1− 2√perror
)2
 ≤K + 12 M¯B
4 ln(2)
[
2 + (K − 1)M¯B](
1− 2√perror
)2
 . (C.4)
We take inequality (C.4) because it delivers a tighter lower bound on M¯B , and we dismiss (C.3). Moreover,
for simplicity, we will consider that all the K parties each send the same amount of M bits. We remark,
though, that this latter simplification is not required to complete our development.
By replacing the term K − 1 in (C.4) with K to get rid of the ceiling function in an easy way, and,
additionally, by completing the square we finally obtain
N ≤ 4 ln(2) (2 +KM)M(
1− 2√perror
)2 < 4 ln(2)(
1− 2√perror
)2(M√K + 1√K
)2
. (C.5)
Solving for M in the inequality above, we get a lower bound on the number of transmitted bits per user
required in a classical K-user fingerprinting protocol as
M >
(
1− 2√perror
)√
N
2
√
K ln 2
− 1
K
[bits/user]. (C.6)
Following a similar procedure as above if K is even, the same result in (C.6) is also valid as a lower bound.
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